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STANDING AFTER HAVENS REALTY: A 
CRITIQUE AND AN ALTERNATIVE 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
PAUL A. LEBEL* 
For more than a decade, the United States Supreme Court has 
required that a plaintiff demonstrate an "injury in fact" in order to sat-
isfy the Constitution's case-or-controversy prerequisite to the exercise 
of Article III judicial power.1 Intended to supplant the "legal injury" 
test employed in earlier decisions,2 the injury in fact standard has been 
shown to be a mutable and poorly defined standard against which to 
measure standing.3 The inability to define "injury in fact" with any 
precision indicates the tremendous burdens constitutional standing re-
quirements are expected to bear in the Court's attempts to delineate 
generally the boundaries of justiciability. Perhaps it is no surprise, 
then, that a recent decision displays not only signs of strain in the in-
jury in fact standard, but is also evidence of cracks in the conceptual 
framework of the standing doctrine. 
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William 
and Mary; Associate Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law. I wish to 
thank Ms. Carolyn Thomas Moore, a 1982 graduate of the University of Alabama School of Law, 
for her able assistance in the preparation of this article. My understanding of the issues discussed 
in this article has benefited from discussion with my colleague at Alabama, Larry Yackle. His 
contribution, as well as the insightful comments of Fred Schauer at William and Mary, are 
gratefully acknowledged. 
1. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). 
2. The concept of legal injury generally eucompassed only violations of a legal right pro-
tected by common law or statute. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940). 
See also infta note 38. In Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 
(1970), the Court recognized that an interference with an economic interest in freedom from com-
petition was an injury in fact for Article III standing purposes even though the interference did 
not constitute a legal injury. For a discussion of the difference, see Davis, The Liberalized Law of 
Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 457 (1970). See also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE ACTION 501 (1965). 
3. Compare United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1975) with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See generally Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
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This past term, in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,4 the Court de-
cided that a particular kind of plaintiff-a "white tester"5-did not 
have standing under the Fair Housing Act in his capacity as a tester.6 
The white tester attempted to sue landlords in Richmond, Virginia, 
who made misrepresentations to others about the availability of apart-
ment units. In reaching the conclusion that the white tester did not 
have standing, the Court seems to have fallen back on a legal injury 
requirement for standing.7 It has disposed of the white tester's claim in 
a way that fails to distinguish the question whether a plaintiff has 
standing to sue from the question whether a plaintiff has stated a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. 8 
4. 102 S. Ct. 1114 (1982), qff'g in part & rev'g in part, Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 
384 (4th Cir. 1980). 
5. A "white tester'' in the context of Havens Realty means a nonminority individual who 
would pose as a potential renter or purchaser in order to obtain information about housing availa-
bility from a realty company or landlord. This information could then be compared to that infor-
mation given minority individuals-"black testers"- by the same realty company or landlord. 
Disparities in the information given the two kinds of testers might constitute evidence of unlawful 
practices under the Fair Housing Act. See 102 S. Ct. at 1121; see also i'!fra text accompanying 
note 17; Schwemm, Standing to Sue in Fair Housing Cases, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. I, 75 (1980); Note, 
Gladstone v. Village o/ Bellwood: The .Development and Application o/ Standing to the Fair Housing 
Acto/ 1968, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 175, 175 n.2 (1979); Comment, Fair Housing-The Use l!(Testers to 
£'!force Fair Housing Laws-When Testers Are Sued, 21 ST. LOUIS U.LJ. 172, 190-92 (1977); 
Note, Real Estate Steering and the Fair Housing Acto/ 1968, 12 TULSA L.J. 758, 770-71 (1977). 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976). The Act generally prohibits racially discriminatory prac-
tices in housing. 
7. The Court left ambiguous the precise nature of its decision with regard to the white tes-
ter's standing, noting that he had made no argument in the Supreme Court defending the court of 
appeals' holding that he had standing to sue in his capacity as a tester, and that he "appears to 
concede its error." 102 S. Ct. at 1122 n.l5. The Court did say that it could "discern no support for 
the Court of Appeals' holding that (the white tester] has standing to sue in his capacity as a tester." 
Id at 1122. Muddying the waters even further, the Court also held that the white tester might 
have standing on a •:neighborhood standing" basis previously recognized in Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 97-98, Ill (1979), and indicated that the district court on 
remand should allow the white tester to make the allegations contained in the complaint more 
definite in order to demonstrate that this basis of standing was in fact present. 102 S. Ct. at 1124. 
For discussion of neighborhood standing, see i'!fra text accompanying notes 25-27. 
8. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6). The Court refers to the white tester's complaint as demon-
strating a failure to plead "a cause of action," and characterizes this failure as "[m]ore to the 
point" than the lack of standing to sue in the plaintiff's capacity as a tester to whom truthful 
information was given. Thus one might argue that the Court decided that the white tester's claim 
could not go to trial on the merits because he failed to state a claim for relief rather than because 
he lacked standing as a tester. 
This does not seem to describe accurately what the Court did in Havens Realty, however. 
The Court has held that standing is a jurisdictional matter, see Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 
411, 421 (1969) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968), and thus the standing question must be 
answered in the affirmative in order for a court to reach the substantive claims for relief. Because 
the Court stated that it found no support for the court of appeals' holding that Willis had tester 
standing, see 102 S. Ct. at 1122, the claim for relief issue was not properly before the Court. 
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The Court's disposition of the white-tester standing issue in Havens 
Realty was not central to the disposition of the case,9 nor does it repre-
sent a clear repudiation of standing doctrines to which the Court cur-
rently adheres. 10 Nevertheless, the Court's approach does raise 
questions about the direction in which standing may be developing. Of 
particular concern is the degree to which the Court's action concerning 
the white tester's standing will affect the "private attorney general" the-
ory of standing to challenge administrative action. 11 This article does 
not attempt to unravel the Supreme Court's snarled line of standing 
decisions following the adoption of the injury in fact standard in 
1970.12 It uses Havens Realty as an opportunity to demonstrate the 
The most extensive work to date on the relationship between the concepts of standing and 
claim for relief is Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for 
Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974). Professor Albert argues that, in the context of judicial 
review of allegedly unlawful government action, courts ought to recognize that the standing in-
quiry involves "an adjudication of familiar components of a cause of action, resolved by asking 
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for relief." Id. at 426 (footnote omitted). This is apparently 
also Professor Currie's view. See D. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 
41;seealso Schwemm,supra note 5, at 7-8. Part 1 ofthis article demonstrates the undesirability of 
this view of standing in a context other than the review of administrative action. Part II examines 
the operation Qf Professor Albert's view, as adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado, and finds 
it wanting even in the context of judicial review of administrative action. 
9. The Court did hold open the possibility that the white plaintiff who lacked standing in a 
tester capacity might have standing on a "neighborhood standing" basis. See supra note 7. If a 
white tester can obtain "neighborhood standing," then the tester standing theory may not have 
much significance to him. For the suggestion that neighborhood standing may not have been 
available in Havens Realty, however, see i'!fra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
Furthermore, even if the white plaintiff had tester standing as a constitutional matter, a sound 
analysis of practical considerations along the lines suggested in this article, see i'!fra notes 118-56 
and accompanying text, may lead to the conclusion that, on nonconstitutional grounds, a court 
might choose not to recognize the white plaintifi's standing as a tester. Should the white plaintiff 
lack standing on any basis whatsoever, the availability of individual black plaintiffs, as well as an 
organizational plaintiff, may suffice to bring before a court the merits of Fair Housing Act viola-
tions similar to those alleged in Havens Realty. 
10. See generally supra notes 7-8. 
11. The private attorney general theory is most often associated with Judge Frank's opinion 
in Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 
U.S. 707 (1943); cf. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (employing the 
concept but not using the term). Part II of this article addresses the impact Havens Realty could 
have on this theory of judicial review of administrative action. 
12. One critic of the line of Supreme Court standing decisions has referred to a "sense of 
intellectual crisis" created by "erratic, even bizarre" judicial behavior. J. VINING, LEGAL IDEN-
TITY: THE COMING OF AoE OF PUBLIC LAW 1 (1978). Another commentator has characterized 
the Supreme Court's standing decisions after 1970 as "largely irrational," but explainable by the 
"motivation of the Justices to sacrifice rationality of the law of standing in order to produce 
wanted substantive results." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 326 (2d ed. Supp. 1982). 
A state supreme court has said that the line of cases beginning in 1970 does "not articulate a 
coherent body of standing law." Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 
P.2d 1051, 1055 n.S (Colo. 1980). Nevertheless, for helpful general discussions of standing since 
the Supreme Court's decision in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 
( 1970), see, e.g., Albert, Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. 
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flaws in the Court's analysis of white-tester standing13 and to explore 
the effects that this flawed analysis could have on the issue of standing 
to obtain review of administrative action. 14 Finally, drawing on this 
analysis, the article develops a multiple factor framework for the analy-
sis of standing, 15 designed to reduce the constitutional dimensions of 
the standing inquiry and to resolve the problem of controlling access to 
federal courts by utilizing a more flexible analysis of practical standing 
considerations. · 
I. HAVENS REALTY: THE LEGAL INJURY TEST REVIVED? 
In 1978, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), a "non-
profit corporation created for the purpose of eliminating unlawful, dis-
criminatory housing practices" in the Richmond, Virginia, area,l6 
employed a number of testers to inquire into the availability of housing 
in the Richmond metropolitan area. 17 Among these testers was R. 
Kent Willis, who is white. On three occasions in March of that year, he 
contacted Havens Realty to inquire about the availability of apart-
ments owned and operated by Havens. On each occasion a Havens 
Realty employee told him that an apartment was available. On each of 
the three days that Willis made an inquiry, a black HOME employee 
acting as a tester was told by Havens Realty that no apartments were 
available. In January of 1979, HOME, Willis, and two black plaintiffs 
sued Havens Realty and a Havens employee in federal district court, 
alleging that the defendants had made racially discriminatory misrep-
resentations concerning the availability of rental units, and that the 
misrepresentations constituted a practice of "racial steering."18 The 
CAL. L. REv. 1139 (1977); Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate 
Su"ogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE LJ. 425 (1974); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article 
Ill· Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979); 
Brilmayer,A Reply, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1727 (1980); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 
(1971); Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notiee Pleading, and Standing, 65 CoRNELL L. REv. 390 (1980); 
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1973); Stew-
art, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1975); Tushnet, 
The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977); Tushnet, 
The "Case or Controversy" Controversy, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1698 (1980). 
13. See i'!fra notes 16-60 and accompanying text. 
14. See i'!fra notes 61-95 and accompanying text. 
15. See i'!fra notes 96-156 and accompanying text. 
16. HOME is so described in Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 
1980), affd in part & rev'd in part, 102 S. Ct. 1114 (1982). 
17. See supra note 5 for a brief definition of the term "tester." 
18. "Racial steering" has been defined as "directing prospective home buyers interested in 
equivalent properties to different areas according to their raee." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94 (1979); see also Note, Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood: Ex-
panding Standing Under the Fair Housing Act, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 783, 786·89 (1980); 
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court dismissed the claims of all but one of the individual plaintiffs, 
holding that the other plaintiffs lacked standing under both the Fair 
Housing Act19 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.20 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that all the plaintiffs had 
standing under the Fair Housing Act.21 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. 22 
A. The Court's Rejection of Standing for the White Tester. 
Cases decided prior to Havens Realty had raised the issue of tester 
standing,23 but the Supreme Court had not reviewed the issue.24 In its 
most recent Fair Housing Act standing decision prior to Havens Realty, 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,25 the Court was able to by-
pass the tester issue because the plaintiffs did not press their claim for 
standing in their capacity as testers before the Court. The plaintiffs 
claimed that the defendants' racial steering practices deprived them of 
the benefits of living in an integrated community. Accordingly, the 
Court limited its discussion to the issue of whether homeowners in such 
target neighborhoods26 had standing as home owners or residents.27 By 
granting certiorari in Havens Realty, the Court seemed prepared to face 
squarely the question of tester standing. Unfortunately, the Court only 
added to the confusion in its current approach to the law of standing.28 
In Havens Realty the Court unanimously held29 that Willis, the 
Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 809-12 (1976). 
The practice violates the Fair Housing Act, which provides that "it shall be unlawful ... [t]o 
represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is 
not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available," 42 U.S.C. § 
3604(d) (1976). 
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
20. 42 u.s.c. § 1982 (1976). 
21. Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980). 
22. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 451 U.S. 905 (1981). 
23. See, e.g., Village of Bellwood v. Dwayne Realty, 482 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1979); 
Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales, 429 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
But see Schwemm, supra note 5, at 75; Co=ent, supra note 5, at 190-92. 
24. For a review of the Supreme Court decisions on fair housing claims, see Note, Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman: Extending Standing in Racial Steering c.:ares to Housing Associations and 
Testers, 22 URB. L. ANN. 107, 119-34 (1981). 
25. 441 u.s. 91 (1979). 
26. These target neighborhoods are neighborhoods that were becoming, or were being main-
tained as, racially segregated as a result of the realtors' practice of steering white prospective 
buyers only to white neighborhoods and black prospective buyers only to black or integrated 
neighborhoods. 
27. 441 U.S. at lll. 
28. See supra note 12 (current irrationality in the Court's approach to standing). 
29. Justice Powell, the author of the majority opinion in Gladstone, Realtors, filed the only 
separate opinion. He questioned the individual plaintiffs' ability in Havens Realty to establish 
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white tester, did not have standing as a tester. 30 The Court concluded, 
however, that Coleman, the black tester, had satisfied the Article III 
requirement of injury in fact.31 This would have given Coleman stand-
ing under the Fair Housing Act as a tester.32 The Court's reason for 
distinguishing between the black and white individual plaintiffs on the 
issue of tester standing involved a literal reading of section 804( d) of 
the Fair Housing Act, which makes it, inte_r alia, "unlawful . . . to rep-
resent to any person because of race . . . that any dwelling is not avail-
able for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so 
available."33 Havens Realty told HOME's black tester that units were 
not available when such units allegedly were available.34 That allega-
tion, if true, would establish a violation of section 804. Havens Realty 
told HOME's white tester that apartments were available, and in fact 
there were units available.35 Consequently, the white tester had not 
alleged that Havens Realty provided him with false information about 
the availability of housing. The Court seemed to reason that, as a re-
sult, Havens Realty had not violated any section 804 right of the white 
tester to receive truthful information. The Court concluded that there 
was thus no basis for recognizing the tester standing of Willis, the indi-
vidual white plaintiff.36 
The Court's focus on whether Havens Realty's conduct invaded 
Willis' congressionally-created right to truthful, nondiscriminatory 
"neighborhood standing" based on what he characterized as "a particularly disturbing example of 
lax pleading." 102 S. Ct. at 1127. 
30. 102 S. Ct. at 1122. 
31. Id. 
32. In Gladstone, Realtors the Court had held that standing under section 812 of the Fair 
Housing Act was as broad as Article III of the Constitution permitted. 441 U.S. at 109. The Court 
had earlier held that standing under section 810 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976), showed the 
same congressional intent to confer standing to the limits of Article Ill. Trafficante v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). Thus, the Havens Realty black tester plaintiff, having 
shown an injury in fact satisfying the Article III requirement, would have encountered no other 
hurdles in establishing that she had standing as a tester. The Supreme Court decided, however, 
that Coleman's tester claim was time-barred by not having been brought within 180 days after the 
defendants allegedly made misrepresentations to her. 102 S. Ct. at 1125-26. 
33. 42 u.s.c. § 3604(d) (1976). 
34. Ms. Coleman, the black tester plaintiff in the suit against Havens Realty, inquired four 
times about the availability of apartments at Havens Realty complexes. Each time she was told 
that no apartments were available. 102 S. Ct. at 1118-19. 
35. Id 
36. Respondent Willis' situation is different. He made no allegation that petitioners mis-
represented to him that apartments were unavailable in the two apartment complexes. 
To the contrary, Willis alleged that on each occasion that he inquired he was informed 
that apartments were available. As such, Willis has alleged no injury to his statutory 
right to accurate information concerning the availability of housing. We thus discern no 
support for the Court of Appeals' holding that Willis has standing to sue in his capacity 
as a tester. 
102 S. Ct. at 1122 (emphasis in original). 
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housing information is not properly a standing inquiry. It raises in-
stead the question whether Willis had stated a claim on which relief 
could be granted.37 By confusing the two questions in this fashion, the 
Court in Havens Realty raises the possibility that the legal injury test, 
which required plaintiffs to show an invasion of a "private substantive 
legally protected interest,"38 is again being read into the Article III re-
quirement of standing. 39 
37. The Court noted that "because Willis does not allege that he was a victim of a discrimi-
natory misrepresentation, he has not pleaded a cause of action under§ 804(d)." 102 S. Ct. at 1122. 
In Gladstone, Realtors, the Court had noted that whether the "respondents themselves are ... 
granted substantive rights by § 804 . . . hardly determines whether they may sue to enforce the 
§ 804 rights of others. . . . The central issue at this stage . . . is not who possesses the legal rights 
protected by§ 804, but whether respondents were genuinely injured by conduct that violates some-
one's § 804 rights, and thus are entitled to seek redress of that harm under§ 812." Gladstone, 
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979) (emphasis in original). Of course, not 
all the relief generally available under the Fair Housing Act necessarily should be granted to all 
plaintiffs who have standing to assert violations of the Act. Section 812 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3612(c) (1976), provides for compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. See 
generally Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A Critique, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 159, 180 (1973). A white 
tester plaintiff might appropriately seek an injunction against misrepresentations of housing avail----
ability on the basis of race, but an award of compensatory or punitive damages would seem to be 
inappropriate relief for such a plaintiff. See generally Schwemm, supra note 5, at 8-9. 
'38. In Teunessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), the Court described the legal injury 
test as follows: 
The appellants invoke the doctrine that one threatened with direct and special injury by 
the act of an agent of the government which, but for statutory authority for its perform-
ance, would be a violation of his legal rights, may challenge the validity of the statute in 
a suit against the ageut. The principle is without application unless the right invaded is a 
legal right-~>ne of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious 
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege. 
/d at 137-38. 
The language quoted in the text draws on Judge Frank's summary of the legal injury 
approach: 
In a suit in a federal court by a citizen against a government officer, complaining of 
alleged past or threatened future unlawful conduct by the defendant, there is no justicia-
ble "controversy," without which, under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, the court has 
no jurisdiction, unless the citizen shows that such conduct or threatened conduct invades 
or will invade a private substantive legally protected interest of the plaintiff citizen; such 
invaded interest must be either of a "recognized" character, at "common law" or a sub-
stantive private legally protected interest created by statute. 
Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 
U.S. 708 (1943) (issue mooted by expiration of Bituminous Coal Act) (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court rejected this legal injury or legal interest test in Association of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), as being "a matter quite distinct from the 
problem of standing." ld at 153 n.l. For an interesting parallel between the legal injury test and 
the restrictive standing opinions of the 1970s, see Comment, Form and Function: Federal Standing 
Since Warth v. Seldin, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 200 n.l03 (1978). 
39. If the Court is to be consistent with its prior rulings that the only limitations on standing 
in Fair Housing Act cases are those imposed by Article III, see supra note 32, the decision that 
Willis does not have standing must have constitutional undertones. This article critiques the legal 
injury test's blend of standing and claim for relief issues. See infra notes 61-95 and accompanying 
text. 
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B. The White Tester Should Have Standing Under the Current Injitry 
in Fact Standard 
Under the Supreme Court's current standing analysis,4o the plain-
tiff must have suffered an injury in fact redressable by the relief sought 
from the court in order to satisfy the constitutional standing require-
ment.41 Nothing in this version of the constitutional test of standing 
requires the plaintiff to show that the injury also constitutes the inva-
sion of a right created by the statute allegedly violated by the defend-
ant.42 In Havens Realty, the Court's analysis-tracking statutory rights 
40. It is possible to define a "mainstream" standing test as that test first enunciated in Associ-
ation of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 
159 (1970). The ./}ala Processing test consists of two questions: first, "whether the plaintiff alleges 
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise," and second, 
"whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 397 
U.S. at 152-153. 
41. One of the Court's most recent reiterations of the constitutional standards for standing 
states that the 
essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to invoke the court's juris-
diction have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure 
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court 
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. . . . This re· 
quirement of a personal stake must consist of a distinct and palpable injury to the plain· 
tiff ... and a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the 
challenged conduct. 
Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1680 (1982). 
42. Such a connection between the injury that the plaintiff alleges and a right created by 
statute would seem to be a form of the nexus requirement introduced and applied in Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In setting out the standing requirements for federal taxpayers who 
challenge federal spending programs, the Flast Court described two nexuses that had to be estab-
lished: first, a link between the plaintiffs status as a taxpayer and the type oflegislative enactment 
attacked, and second, a link between the taxpayer status and the precise nature of the constitu-
tional infringement alleged. See id at 102. For a discussion of whether the white tester plaintiff 
would satisfy a similar nexus requirement, see i'!fra text accompanying notes 54-60. In any event, 
the Supreme Court has strictly limited the applicability of the Flast nexus requirements to cases of 
taxpayer standing. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 
(1978), in which the Court observed that although the argument had been made "that the nexus 
requirement ... has general applicability," a litigant would have to show a "nexus between the 
right asserted and the injury alleged only in the context of taxpayer suits." 
The Court's collapsing of the standing inquiry and the claim for relief question is prefigured 
by developments in the first amendment, see Rendleman, Free Press-Fair Trial· Restrictive Orders 
Afler Nebraska Press, 67 KY. LJ. 867, 877-79 (1978-79), and the fourth amendment, see Kuhns, 
Tlze Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing Cases, 65 IOWA L. REV. 493 
(1980); Williamson, Fourth Amendment Standing and Expectations of Privacy: Rokas v. Illinols and 
New ./}irectionsfor Some Old Concepts, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 831 (1979), to the United States Con-
stitution. Regarding the fourth amendment standing issue, Professor Williamson characterizes 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), as "the first case in which the United States Supreme Court 
has expressly acknowledged the close relationship between the concept of standing and the merits 
of the substantive claims presented by litigants." 31 U. FLA. L. REV. at 835. InRakas, the Court 
concluded "that the type of standing requirement [that a person making a motion to suppress must 
have been a victim of the search and seizure] is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourtlt 
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created by the Fair Housing Act-focused on whether the white tester 
personally received a discriminatory misrepresentation of housing 
availability.43 The relevant question under injury in fact analysis, how-
ever, remains whether the defendants' practice of giving racially dis-
criminatory housing information injured the white tester. In a Fair 
Housing Act misrepresentation case, the defendant's conduct should be 
viewed as inflicting an informational injury44 on the class of people to 
whom the defendants made representations. An isolated piece of infor-
mation is relatively meaningless in the housing context. Only after the 
defendants have made a number of statements can anyone validly con-
clude whether any statements were false and whether the defendants' 
practices can be characterized as racial steering. The persons injured 
are those to whom the defendants direct this total package of informa-
tion. Whether the recipients of any particular statement were white or 
black is irrelevant to the determination of whether the entire class of 
recipients has suffered injury.4s 
Amendment doctrine." 439 U.S. at 139. This leaves the Court with the question ''whether the 
challenged search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who 
seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in tum requires a determination of 
whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the 
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect." Id. at 140 (emphasis added). 
Rakas demonstrates the Court's blending of what had previously been identified as standing 
considerations into the question of the scope of fourth amendment protection. Havens Realty 
suggests that the Court is incorporating a claim for relief inquiry into what had previously been 
considered a matter of Article III standing. The distinction between the two cases is more than a 
matter of semantics, more than a quibbling about what-gets-merged-into-what. Although it may 
be true that "no decided cases of this Court ... would have come out differently" under a sub-
stantive fourth amendment rather than a standing inquiry, id at 139, that clearly cannot be said 
of the Havens Realty transformation of standing. See i'!(ra notes 78-95 and accompanying text. 
43. The white tester "made no allegation that petitioners misrepresented to him that apart-
ments were unavailable." 102 S. Ct at 1122 (emphasis added). 
44. Cf. Note, I'!formational Injuries as a Basis for Standing, 19 CoLUM. L. REV. 366 (1979) 
(drawing a distinction between injury to economic, enviroruD.ental, recreational, and aesthetic in-
terests, on the one hand, and injury to a litigant's interest in information, on the other). The 
author focuses on information held by a governmental entity, but his definition of informational 
interests as existing ''whenever litigants seek information possessed by another party," id at 366, 
would encompass the interest in seeking information from a landlord about the availability of 
housing. The informational character of the injury is revealed when the business of the defend-
ants is seen "as a service that disseminates information covering a broad spectrum of factors usu-
ally considered by prospective purchasers . . . , such as the quality and location of the schools, 
transportation, property values, proximity to employment and the crime rate." Note, Real Estate 
Steering and the Fair HoiiSing Act of 1968, 12 TULSA L.J. 758, 762-64 (1977). 
45. White testers acquire information about the practice of realtors on the same basis as 
black testers. One commentator, however, labels white testers as "corroborative" testers to distin-
guish them from black, or ''litigious," testers. See Comment, Fair HoiiSing-The Use of Testers to 
E'!force Fair HoiiSi'ng Laws-When Testers are Sued, 21 ST. Loms U.L.J. 170, 184-85 (1977). 
That distinction lends itself to viewing the white testers as "no more than an investigative tool," id. 
at 184, rather than as potential plaintiffs. This article makes the opposite point that a white tester 
is also properly a "litigious" tester. To deny standing for the white tester would be to ignore the 
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The preceding analysis is not a disguised version of citizen stand-
ing46 in which an individual plaintiff asserts no more than a general 
interest in lawful behavior.47 Three factors distinguish a white tester 
and his claim of injury from any other citizen who is offended by 
Havens Realty's alleged racial steering.4s 
First, in both his actions and his motive, the white tester plaintiff 
in Havens Realty differs from the mass of citizens who object to racial 
discrimination in general and discriminatory housing practices in par-
ticular. As a HOME employee, Willis participated in a concerted effort 
to determine whether Havens Realty engaged in racial steering. Willis 
also resided in one of the political subdivisions in which HOME sought 
to bring about equal housing opportunities.49 These facts indicate a 
specific, localized concern with the particular instances of unlawful 
conduct challenged in the lawsuit. A localized concern of this sort, 
which will usually be apparent on the face of the pleadings, provides a 
line separating particularly injured persons from the general citizenry. 
Courts can set standing limits to correspond with that line rather than 
to reflect the demarcation between those who hold a statutorily created 
right invaded by the defendant's conduct and those who hold no such 
right. 5° 
Second, as noted earlier,51 the Court has held that Congress in-
tended to grant standing to assert violations of the Fair Housing Act to 
the full extent permitted by Article III. Having reached this conclusion 
without reservation, the Court should not now read into the constitu-
tional injury-in-fact requirement considerations that are essentially 
informational injury defendants have inflicted on those who were being steered. Furthermore, 
recognizing that both black and white testers suffer the same informational injury from the de-
fendants' pattern of statements avoids hair-splitting exercises in semantics in evaluating the truth 
or falsity of defendants' responses to the testers' questions. 
46. See generally, Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or 
Ideological Plaint!!f, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968). 
47. Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982) (denying citizen standing to taxpayers challenging the 
conveyance of federal surplus property to a college operated by a religious order). 
48. For a suggested restructuring of the constitutional and nonconstitutional components of 
the standing inquiry, see i'!(ra notes 96-156 and accompanying text. Identifying a white tester 
with the general population would properly be couched as a practical reason for denying standing, 
but would not be deemed a constitutional matter. 
49. ''The ... individual plaintiffs ... at the time the complaint was filed were all residents 
of the City of Richmond or the adjacent Henrico County." 102 S. Ct. at 1119. See supra text 
accompanying note 16. 
50. The latter distinction is one that cannot normally be made on the basis of the pleadings. 
It involves instead a consideration of legislative purpose, and quickly involves the court in the 
merits of the claim. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 175-76 
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
51. See supra note 32. 
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prudential in nature. By deciding that the white tester lacks standing 
because Havens Realty had not violated his right to truthful informa-
tion, the Court refuses to let Willis assert the statutory rights of those to 
whom the defendants allegedly provided false information regarding 
rental vacancies. To remain consistent with its past decisions, the 
Court should acknowledge that. a denial of standing for this reason 
does not proceed from a constitutional basis, but rather from "pruden-
tial principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions 
of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated 
and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to 
assert a particular claim."52 Two facts therefore distinguish the white 
tester plaintiff from the general citizen who alleges a violation of some 
legal duty imposed on the defendant: (1) Congress swept away all but 
the constitutional barriers to standing, and (2) asserting the legal rights 
of others has been treated as a nonconstitutional restriction on 
standing. 53 
Finally, even if the Supreme Court were to extend its restrictive 
approach to citizen or taxpayer54 standing to this case, Willis would 
have satisfied the requirements the Court would most likely have set 
out. If the F!ast v. Cohen 55 taxpayer standing nexus requirements56 
were to be reworked into a citizen standing test, the test probably 
would be stated in the form suggested by the Supreme Court in .Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group:57 a "subject matter 
nexus between the right asserted and the injury alleged."S8 Willis could 
52. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979). 
53. Id; see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); id at 769 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
54. Citizen and taxpayer suits are similar in that they contemplate a very broad class of 
litigants who are able to challenge governmental action on the basis of a remote or tenuous link to 
that action. The taxpayer plaintiff alleges some unauthorized use of federal revenues, at least a 
portion of which in theory have come from the plaintiff. Professor Jaffe suggests that "[t]he point 
of the distinction . . . is that the plaintiff in the taxpayer's suit is thought to be 'affected' in a sense 
that distinguishes him from the citizen who ... is the mere instrument of the public's concern." 
L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 473. 
55. 392 u.s. 83 (1968). 
56. See supra note 42. 
57. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
58. Id at 79. Had the Court in .Duke Power acknowledged the true nature of the plaintiffs' 
uyury in that case, the plaintiffs would have satisfied this nexus. The Court phrased the right and 
the injury in the following language: ''The only uyury that would possess the required subject-
matter nexus to the due process challenge is the uyury that would result from a nuclear accident 
causing damages in excess of the liability limitation provisions of the Price-Anderson Act." Id at 
78 n.23. To find a nexus, however, the Court needed only to recognize that the uyury that the 
plaintiffs suffered lay in the destruction of their latent or inchoate claim for damages above the 
Price-Andersou Act ceiling. The environmental and health effects identified by the Court as con-
stituting injury in fact from the operation of Duke Power Company's nuclear power plants, id. at 
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assert a right to insist on the defendants' compliance with the Fair 
Housing Act's prohibition of discriminatory misrepresentation and 
could allege as an injury the receipt of part of the total package of 
information disseminated by the defendants as they engaged in racial 
steering.59 Thus, even under the restrictive test, which the Supreme 
Court has until now refused to extend beyond the context of taxpayers' 
suits,60 the white tester would have standing as a tester. 
Because, as these three factors illustrate, recognizing white tester 
standing in Havens Realty would not open the door to mere citizen 
standing, the Supreme Court's flawed analysis cannot be excused by 
claiming that its result is "a necessary evil." Nor, as the next section of 
this article demonstrates, is the error of the Court's analysis benign, in 
the sense of doing little damage. 
II. HAVENS .REALTr'S IMPLICATIONS FOR STANDING TO OBTAIN 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
Defenders of the result in Havens Realty might argue that even if 
the Supreme Court has collapsed a claim for relief inquiry into the 
standing requirement, the development will not prove decisive in many 
cases.61 In Havens Realty itself, for example, because the Court left 
open the possibility that the white tester could have standing on a 
neighborhood standing basis, 62 the denial of tester standing might ap-
pear insignificant. The Havens Realty facts suggest, however, that a 
white tester may not be able to demonstrate, at a standing hearing, that 
he resides in a neighborhood subjected to steering practices that de-
prive him of the benefits of interracial associations. 63 For example, if a 
73-74, represented valid indicia of the likelihood that, in the event of a serious nuclear power plant 
accident (or "incident"), the plaintiffs adversely affected by low level radiation, for example, 
would be in such close proximity to the plant that they would suffer the harms serving as the basis 
of a claim for damages. The deprivation of an opportunity to hold another party liable for the 
harm caused by that party's conduct does implicate due process rights. See Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
59. q: supra note 45 (A white tester such as Willis might engage in an attempt to impute 
false connotations to the replies he received from artfully phrased questions posed to realtors. 
This focus on interpretations is avoided by treating the combined true and false statements issued 
by a realtor as an informational package presented to the segment of the public consisting of white 
and black testers.). 
60. See supra note 42. 
61. For the suggestion that the distinction between a dismissal for lack of standing and a 
dismissal for failure to state a claim can be a significant procedural matter, see Schwemm, supra 
note 5, at 13 n.53. 
62. See supra notes 7 & 9, and text accompanying notes 25-27. 
63. In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village if Bellwood, the Court recognized the standing of four 
individual respondents who "actually reside within the target area of Bellwood" and who "claim 
that the transformation of their neighborhood from an integrated to a predominately Negro com-
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plaintiff tester lived in an integrated neighborhood that, by chance, was 
not becoming segregated despite the racial steering practices of local 
realtors, the plaintiff would find himself unable to use neighborhood 
standing to assert the realtors' discriminatory practices as violations of 
the Fair Housing Act. Thus tester standing might provide the only ave-
nue to a remedy for the informational injury as a result-of realtors' 
practices that are, for whatever reason, unsuccesful in producing segre-
gated housing patterns. 64 
Even apart from whatever practical effect the Supreme Court's 
analysis of tester standing has in the factual setting of Havens Realty-
type cases, that analysis has potentially significant consequences for the 
scope of standing to obtain judicial review of administrative agency 
decisions. The paradigm case for illustrating those consequences is 
FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station.65 
A. Standing Under Sanders Brothers. 
Sanders Brothers operated radio station WKBB in East Dubuque, 
Illinois. In January of 1936, the Telegraph Herald filed an application 
with the FCC to open a radio station in Dubuque, Iowa. Five months 
later, Sanders Brothers applied for a permit to move its station across 
munity is depriving them of 'the social and professional benefits of living in an integrated soci-
ety.'" 441 U.S. 91, Ill (1979). The Court discussed the distinction between claiming a harm to 
the racial character of a "co=unity" and alleging such harm to "society," and concluded that 
"the allegations of injury to the individual respondents' 'society' refer to the harm done to the 
residents of the carefully described neighborhood in Bellwood in which four of the individual re-
spondents reside." /d. at 112 (emphasis added). The Court noted that it did not "intimate [a] 
view as to whether persons residing outside of the target neighborhood have standing to sue under 
§ 812.'' /d. at 113 n.25. 
The apparent racism of the co=ents quoted above might be tempered somewhat by the 
realization that earlier cases extending standing under the Fair Housing Act involved the exclu-
sion of minority residents from a neighborhood or co= unity. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
64. Another situation in which recognizing tester standing would be an important part of 
enforcement of the legislative intent embodied in the Fair Housing Act is the one encountered 
when the residents of a co= unity or neighborhood wish to maintain existing segregated housing. 
Commenting on Gladstone, Realtors, one writer has observed that if the circumstances in that case 
were such that 
the residents of Bellwood had preferred to live in a segregated area, it is unlikely that the 
suit would ever have been brought. If the residents were unwilling to integrate their 
co=unity, it is likely that the village would have thought it politically wise to accom-
modate the residents. Thus, the two parties who were granted standing would not have 
brought suit and the discrimination would have continued. 
Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Standing to Sue in Federal Court: The .Direct Injury Standard, 2 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 793, 811 (1980). 
65. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). Professor Jaffe characterizes this case as ''the watershed case in the 
law of standing," noting that "it has generated a strong current toward the broader concept of 
standing, particularly where there is present a statutory phrase such as 'person aggrieved' or 'ad-
versely affected,' but even where there is none.'' L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 503. 
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the Mississippi River to Dubuque, Iowa. Subsequent to their own ap-
plication, Sanders Brothers sought and received permission to inter-
vene in the Telegraph Herald license proceedings. The agency granted 
both of the applications, thus licensing two radio stations in Dubuque. 
Before the agency, and in its appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, Sanders Brothers alleged that the adver-
tising market in the broadcast area could not support two stations and 
that WKBB had been operating at a loss. Sanders Brothers claimed 
that the FCC should make findings about, and include in its decision a 
consideration of, the economic injury that a competitor of a license ap-
plicant would suffer if the applicant is granted a license. Because the 
FCC failed to make such findings of fact on the issue of economic in-
jury, the court of appeals reversed the FCC's licensing decision.66 The 
Supreme Court, in tum, reversed the decision of the court of appeals. 67 
Before the Supreme Court, the FCC argued that Sanders Brothers 
did not have standing to obtain judicial review of the agency decision 
to issue a license to the Telegraph Herald. Relying on the proposition 
that economic injury to a competitor did not constitute an independent 
factor that the agency must consider, the FCC contended that "absence 
of right implies absence of remedy."68 The Court rejected the FCC's 
attempt to limit the class of those who had standing to challenge the 
agency decision to those whose legally protected rights or interests were 
invaded by that decision. The Court instead held that the economic 
injury alleged by Sanders Brothers gave the company standing to ob-
tain judicial review of the agency action. 69 The Court tied this grant of 
standing to the congressional extension of appeals from FCC license or 
permit decisions to "any other person aggrieved or whose interests are 
adversely affected by'' a decision of the agency granting or denying an 
application.70 The Court decided that the "other person" language 
could be read as an expression of a congressional "opinion that one 
likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license would be the 
only person having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the 
appellate court errors of law in the action of the Commission in grant-
ing the license."71 The Court gave effect to that congressional intent by 
recognizing the standing of Sanders Brothers "to raise . . . any relevant 
question of law in respect to the orders of the Commission."72 
66. Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. FCC, 106 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1939). 
67. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). 
68. Id. at 477. 
69. Id. 
70. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976). 
71. 309 U.S. at 477. 
72. Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Court in Sanders Brothers recognized that Congress could 
grant standing to a person injured by an agency decision even if the 
injury is not one from which Congress sought to protect the person 
challenging the decision. The challengers injury may not constitute a 
reason for setting aside the agency action, but the challenger who has 
standing as a result of that injury is able to alert the reviewing court to 
any procedural or substantive errors committed by the agency in the 
process of reaching the decision that produced the harm. By setting 
aside the agency decision on the basis of those procedural or substan-
tive errors, the reviewing court may cure the challenger's injury, but 
that relief must remain incidental to some other goal. In the FCC li-
censing context, Congress did not consider amelioration of a competi-
tor's economic injury terribly important; if it had, the statute could 
have required the agency to take the economic injury factor into ac-
count in its license application deliberations. The statute did not, how-
ever, include such a requirement. Thus Congress and the Court must 
have conferred standing for a broader purpose: to bring the agency 
decision before a reviewing court in order for that court to have an 
opportunity to test the decision against a standard of lawful agency 
behavior. 
Sanders Brothers differs conceptually from later decisions recog-
nizing the standing of members of an audience served by a broad-
caster.73 This "audience standing" is analogous to the "neighborhood 
standing" the Supreme Court uses in the Fair Housing Act cases and 
would recognize standing of a member of the audience even under ·an 
analysis that collapses the standing and the claim for relief inquiries 
into one issue. The Federal Communications Act provides that the 
FCC may grant or renew a license only if the action would serve the 
public interest, necessity, or convenience.74 Thus the statute apparently 
implies that viewers or listeners of a licensee have a legal right to be 
served by a broadcaster who operates consistent with the public inter-
est.75 Agency approval of a license application by an applicant who 
73. See e.g., Office of Co=unication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 
1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally Padden, The Emerging Role of Citizens' Groups in Broad· 
cast Regulation, 25 FED. CoM. B.J. 82 (1972). 
74. The Federal Co=unications Co=ission 
shall determine ... whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be 
served by the granting of [a license] application, and if the Co=ission, upon examina-
tion of such application and upon consideration of such other matters as the Co=ission 
may officially notice, shall find that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be 
served by the granting thereof, it shall grant such application. 
47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976). 
75. Courts interpret the statutory standard in a way that allows a very clo~~ scrutiny of the 
licensee's conduct. One recent opinion stated that the ''public interest standard of the Communi-
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allegedly does not so operate therefore invades a legally protected in-
terest of the listening or viewing challenger.76 
The "audience standing" idea played no overt part in the Sanders 
Brothers standing decision. Congress conferred no legal right on Sand-
ers Brothers Radio Station to be free from economic injury as a result 
of a competitor siphoning off limited advertising dollars. 77 As indi-
cated previously, the case thus stands in part for the proposition that 
Congress can grant standing without also creating or recognizing a le-
gal right to be free from the injury $at supports standing. 
B. The Impact of Havens Realty on the Sanders Brothers Analysis. 
Havens Realty raises the possibility that Sanders Brothers Radio 
Station would not have standing if the issue were presented today. As 
a competitor, Sanders Brothers did not have a legally protected interest 
invaded by the action of the FCC. As a white tester, Willis also lacked 
a legally protected interest invaded by Havens Realty's conduct. In 
each case, the conduct challenged harmed the challenger, 7 8 but the alle-
gation of that harm might not have constituted a claim for relief. If 
cations Act implies that the licensee be law-abiding in the operation of the station." WIIite Moun-
tain Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 274, 277 n.8 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). 
This broad interpretation of the duties imposed on tl!e licensee gives a challenger a correspond-
ingly broad range of issues on whicli to attack the license application. 
76. The audience standing cases are direct descendants of TIIe Chicago Junction Case, 263 
U.S. 258 (1924), which Professor Jaffe cl!aracterizes as "the basic case ... until tl!e advent of 
Sanders." L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 507. The parallel is apparent upon consideration of Profes-
sor Jaffe's analysis of Chicago Junction, an analysis that applies equally well to the audience 
standing idea. He concludes that standing in Chicago Junction rested 
on a determination that an interest intended by statute to be protected has been denied 
that protection. . . . It did not mean that there was a right that competition not be 
diminisl!ed. The plaintiff could not win simply by showing sucli dimunition. It did 
mean that the agency was required by the statute to IIave regard to competition as one 
factor in its decision; that it must if it disregards the effect on competition, give a rea-
soned explanation. . . . I would emphatically reject the conclusion that because there 
can be no rights-no "legal injury" in the traditional sense-we are driven to tl!e oppo-
site pole that there is only a "public interest." Where the legislature has recognized a 
certain "interest" as one whiclr must be heede~ it is such a "legally protected interest" as 
warrants standing to complain of its disregard. 
Id. at 507-08 (empl!asis in original). 
77. The Court did indicate that competition might reach such a destructive level as to ad-
versely affect tl!e public interest if neither competitor could provide adequate service to the listen-
ing audience. Emphasizing this aspect of the opinion could move the analysis of Sanders Brothers 
into the audience standing model of the United Church of Christ decision, see supra note 73, in 
which the level of competition becomes one of the factors the agency must consider in making the 
license decision. In the situation actually presented by Sanders Brothers, l!owever, economic in-
jury "is not a separate and independent element to be taken into consideration by the Commis-
sion." 309 U.S. at 476. The Court simply indicates that this "separate and independent element" 
of injury suffices to grant standing to the competitor. 
78. This analysis accepts the cl!aracterization of tl!e white tester's harm set out above. See 
supra text accompanying notes 44-45. 
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stating a claim for relief in the form of an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest is to become part of the new standing jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court, as Havens Realty seems to indicate, then Sanders 
Brothers Radio Station would lack standing to contest the FCC's deci-
sion granting a license to the Telegraph Heral~. 
Some scholars view the Sanders .Brothers case as one involving 
public action and thus as unpersuasive precedent for extending stand-
ing to a broad class of potential plaintiffs.79 A white tester's suit under 
the Fair Housing Act, however, can also lay claim to the label "public 
action,"80 and any relaxation of standing rules appropriate for such ac-
tions81 would apply to the tester as well. Part III of this article offers a 
method of analyzing standing questions that does not require classifica-
tion into rigid, and perhaps meaningless, categories such as public or 
private actions.82 But for those who may consider the collapsing of the 
standing and claim for relief issues into one inquiry to be-a matter of 
no great significance, there is a practical illustration of the implications 
of Havens Realty upon judicial review of administrative action. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado has explicitly adopted the posi-
tion that the Supreme Court appears to be adopting sub rosa in Havens 
Realty: the white tester lacked standing as a tester because the defend-
ants' conduct did not invade a legal right of the plaintiff, even though 
the plaintiff suffered what would otherwise be identified as an injury in 
fact. In Wimberly v. Ettenberg,83 the Supreme Court of Colorado re-
jected the standing analysis of the Association of Data Processing Serv-
79. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 500. ("It might be argued that whatever the purported 
rationale of Sanders •.. a decision upholding the justiciability of a suit brought by a person of a 
very limited class which is in fact adversely affected is not a precedent for permitting actions by 
the unlimited class of citizen or taxpayer.") 
80. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302-
04 (1976), for a "morphology of public law litigation." Professor Sedler says of the public action 
that it is ''brought by the 'non-Hohfeldian' or 'ideological' plaintiff. In practice, it is a group effort, 
and the suit will be backed by group resources ... in order to protect group interests and to 
advance group values that are infringed upon by the governmental action." Sedler, Standing and 
the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for Legislative Reforms, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 
863, 864 (1977). The Fair Housing Act claims brought by the individual plaintiffs in Havens Re-
alty fit this mold. 
81. See Parker & Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 771 (1978). 
But see Sedler, supra note 80 at 864 ("by applying the same principles of standing to both types of 
action [public and private], the Court has severely restricted the use of the 'public action' "). 
82. Professor Jaffe suggests that 
the line between the two cannot be conceived absolutely ..•. The difficulty involved in 
drawing a line between the two types may be one argument against any distinction based 
on the plaintiff's degree of involvement. But many courts do draw such a line, making 
the absence of sufficient interest either dispositive or an element in the exercise of discre-
tionary jurisdiction. 
L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 460. 
83. 194 Colo. 163, 570 P.2d 535 (1977). 
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ice Organization v. Camp, which sought to separate standing from the 
merits of a case;s4 
In our view, a decision on the merits is always inextricably tied to 
every case which involves the issue of standing. When standing is in 
issue, the broad question is whether the plaintiff has stated a claim 
for relief which should be entertained in the context of a trial on the 
merits. If a person suffers no injury in fact, or suffers injury in fact, 
but not from the violation of a legal right, no relief can be offered, 
and the case should be dismissed for lack of standing. 85 
Wimberly produces a two step analysis for Colorado courts to follow in 
resolving issues of standing: "(1) did the plaintiff incur an injury in 
fact? (2) if so, was it to a legally protected interest encompassed by 
statutory or constitutional provisions which allegedly have been 
violated?"86 
84. See 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970); see also supra note 38. 
85. 194 Colo. at 166, 570 P.2d at 539. The Wimberly standing test of whether the plaintiff has 
suffered injury in fact to a legally protected interest as contemplated by statutory or constitutional 
provisions was announced in an action by bail bondsmen to enjoin a state judge from continuing a 
pre-trial release program that the bondsmen claimed was driving them "to the brink of bank-
ruptcy." Id. at 537. The court held that the bondsmen failed to satisfy either of the prongs of the 
test the court was adopting: first, they suffered no injury in fact, only an "indirect and incidental 
pecuniary injury" as a result of the pre-trial release alternatives available to criminal defendants 
that did not require the use of these plaintiffs' services; and second, the "statutory provisions 
concerning bail do not purport to vest any persons other than criminal defendants with any legal 
rights in the determination of the terms, amount, or conditions of bail," so that the plaintiffs were 
"persons without any proteetable legal interest" who were attempting "to interfere with the man-
ner in which the court dispatches its own affairs." Id. at 539. 
86. Dodge v. Department of Social Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 381, 600 P.2d 70, 71 (1979). The 
"legal rights" analysis of standing in Podge and Wimberly is subject to a number of criticisms, the 
most compelling of which is that the legal rights analysis provides an extremely narrow perspec-
tive on the interests affected by the challenged conduct. In a case in which the defendant's con-
duct provides only benefits to those with the legal rights conferred by a statutory scheme, society's 
interest in subjecting that conduct to judicial scrutiny is not well served by an analysis that limits 
standing to challenge the action to those who have been given the legal rights. This was true in 
Wimberly and is true as well in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
See also i'!fra text accompanying note 91. 
In Simon, for example, the Court addressed the standing of individual indigents and organi-
zations composed of indigents to challenge an Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling "al-
lowing favorable tax treatment to a nonprofit hospital that offered only emergency-room services 
to indigents." 426 U.S. at 28. The Court concluded that all of the plaintiffs lacked standing be-
cause no individual had established an actual injury that "fairly can be traced to the challenged 
action of the defendant, [rather than] injury that results from the independent action of some third 
party not before the court." I d. at 41-42. Because the challenged conduct expanded the class of 
hospitals qualifying as charitable organizations under I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1976), the hospitals had 
uo incentive to attack the Revenue Ruling. Nor would persons making contributions to hospitals 
and deducting the donation tend to challenge the Revenue Ruling that increases the ability of 
hospitals to qualify for this tax treatment. By focusing on the legal rights of hospitals to be classi-
fied as charitable organizations and of benefactors to deduct their charitable contributions, the 
Court effectively insulated allegedly unlawful conduet of a government agency from judicial re-
view. The result is that those who have rights created by the statutory scheme are advantageously 
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The effect that adoption of this analysis has on judicial review of 
administrative agency decisions emerges in Cloverlecif Kennel Club~ Inc. 
v. Colorado Racing Commission. 87 The Racing Commission had 
granted a petition by Mile High Kennel Club for additional racing 
dates. Two competitors of Mile High challenged that decision in a pe-
tition for judicial review. Although the Supreme Court of Colorado 
held that the challengers had not suffered a competitive economic in-
jury,88 it also indicated that had the competitors established a competi-
tive injury, the next inquiry would have been whether the statute under 
which the agency acted protects "economic interests from competitive 
harm."89 Had the court construed the statute as neither protecting the 
economic interests of competitors nor conferring standing on competi-
tors,90 then the competitors-perhaps the only class of parties con-
cretely interested in keeping ihe agency decisionmaking confined 
within its statutory boundaries-could not have challenged the agency 
decision. Owners of tracks granted additional racing dates could not be 
expected to challenge the agency action benefiting them, even if the 
agency failed to act in a manner that was procedurally and substan-
tively proper. The effect of the legal injury test is that, as long as 
agency action confers a benefit on those who are regulated or protected 
by the agency's legislative authority, the action is, for all practical pur-
poses, unreviewable.9I 
The United States Supreme Court has not stated in its post-.Data 
Processing decisions that it seeks to return to a legal injury approach,92 
affected by the agency action, and thus have no reason to challenge the action, while those who 
are adversely affected and thus would be natural challengers, have no rights under the legislation. 
Taking too limited a view of the court's role in the smooth functioning of a society governed 
by law, the Wimberly court said that "[i]f a person suffers ... injury in fact, but not from the 
violation of a legal right, no relief can be afforded." 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. That 
statement is simply not true. The court can examine the lawfulness of the challenged conduct, and 
upon a finding of unlawful behavior, can issue both injunctive and declaratory relief. Such relief 
in no way smacks of an advisory opinion. Instead, it resolves a real dispute concerning the proper 
functioning of one branch of government. 
ld 
87. 620 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1980), affg 42 Colo. App. 13, 592 P.2d 1341 (1978). 
88. 620 P.2d at 1057. 
89. Jd. 
90. The court stated that 
the economic impact of lawful competition . . . cannot confer standing under Wimberly 
unless the economic interest harmed is protected by a statutory or constitutional provi-
sion, i.e., unless a legislative intent to protect economic interests from competitive harm 
is explicit or fairly inferable from the statutory provisions under which an agency acts or 
if the legislature expressly confers standing on competitors to seek review of agency ac-
tion. 
91. See supra note 86. 
92. The Supreme Court may hesitate to adopt the approach taken in Colorado in part be-
cause that approach can lead to expanded standing in some instances. For example, on taxpayer 
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but Havens Realty makes that conclusion a permissible inference. The 
Court's approach may in fact restrict standing even more than the Col-
orado court restricted standing in Cloverleaf Kennel Club. The Colo-
rado court at least left open the possibility that the legislature could 
confer standing on competitors to seek review of administrative agency 
action,93 which would be consistent with the Sanders Brothers analy-
sis.94 By framing its standing decision in Havens Realty in constitu-
tional terms,95 however, the United States Supreme Court may have 
effectively precluded any congressional grant of standing to anyone not 
suffering an invasion of a legally protected interest. For observers in-
terested in maintaining effective judicial checks on the exercise of ad-
ministrative agency authority, the restriction of standing suggested by 
Havens Realty is an alarming portent. 
Ill. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR STANDING DECISIONS 
The Supreme Court's standing decisions of the last decade display 
such a lack ofcoherence96 that a continuation ofthe Court's haphazard 
and result-oriented97 methods is no longer tolerable. Furthermore, as 
standing, compare Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) with Dodge v. Department of Social Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 600 
P.2d 70 (1979) and McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981). 
93. 620 P.2d at 1057. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72. 
95. See supra note 39. 
96. See supra note 12. 
97. At times, the Court's standing decisions appear to reflect an attempt to control its ability 
to reach the merits of cases presenting sensitive issues. One critic of Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 
(1975), commented on this approach: 
The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of standing. Read the majority opinion and ask 
yourself whether standing is really the problem. I think you'll say no, the real problem is 
that the petitioners raised enormously sensitive issues of race and economic class the 
Court was unwilling to face. It chose to avoid them by adding some very complicated 
wrinkles to the already vexed law of standing. 
Younger, In Praise of Simplicity, 62 A.B.A. J. 632 (1976). Charges of !llanipulation of standing 
can also cut the other way. One Justice accused the Court of indulging in a "series of specula-
tions" in order to reach the merits, thus "serv[ing] the national interest" by "provid[ing] the coun-
try with an advisory opinion on an important subject." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Other commentators view the restrictive standing decisions of the Supreme Court as based on 
hostility not only to the merits of a particular case, but also to the kind of litigation vehicle used to 
assert certain claims. See Note, Warth v. Seldin: The Substantial Probability Test, 3 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 485 (1976): 
Apart from any considerations of substantive issues, the authors feel that the Warth case, 
as an example of public interest suits at their worst, afforded the Court, already adversely 
predisposed to such actions, an opportunity to place a gloss on the .Data Processing test 
which would dramatically curtail this type of litigation. 
Id at 515-16. But see Comment, Form and Function: Federal Standing Since Warth v. Seldin, 18 
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 183, 201 (1978) (Warth test as used in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 
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this article's analysis of the Havens Realty decision demonstrates, the 
Court's recent decisions may have significant and perhaps unintended 
negative results.98 This final section sketches a foundation for a frame-
work on which a flexible and manageable standing analysis can rest. 
Implementing such a rational standing framework requires two major 
steps: first, a cutting back of the constitutional component of standing 
from the proportions it has assumed under the Court's current ap-
proach; and second, the development of an analytical taxonomy for the 
practical considerations99 that ought to go into a standing decision. Af-
ter illustrating these steps, this section will demonstrate how the pro-
posed a.n.aiytical framework operates. 
A. Step One: Restricting the Constitutional Component of Standing. 
By limiting federal judicial power to "cases" and "controver-
sies,"100 Article III of the United States Constitution arguably requires 
only an adversary relationship between the parties on opposite sides of 
the litigation. 101 The concept of injury in fact as developed by the 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), seen as simply a useful guideline for restricting the federal judi-
cial power rather than as a means of avoiding difficult constitutional questions). 
Whatever the suppositions of law review writers about the manipulation of the standing tests 
to reach or to avoid the merits, occasional displays of judicial frankness exist, such as the state-
ment that "since we intend to decide this issue on its merits, we see no purpose to be served by 
debating the question of standing any further." Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of 
Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), 
rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
98. See supra notes 61-95 and accompanying text. 
99. The adjective "practical" is used deliberately in place of "prudential," the term encoun-
tered in the decisions. See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 
(1979). The considerations set out at infra notes 127-156 and accompanying text are intended for 
use as guidelines for a case-by-case determination of whether a particular plaintiff has standing in 
a specific case. Focusing on "prudential principles" rather than "practical considerations" could 
undermine the flexibility of the suggested approach because the Supreme Court could adopt a set 
of prudential principles to be applied rigidly or inflexibly in all cases. C.f. Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978) ("Where a party champions his own 
rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particularized one which will be prevented 
or redressed by the relief requested, the basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the 
standing dot:trine are generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met."). 
100. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;-to Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to 
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more 
States;-between a· State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different 
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different 
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects. 
U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). 
101. In his discussion of the meaning of case or controversy, Professor Bickel says that courts 
"may not decide non-cases, which do not require decision because they are not adversary situations 
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Supreme Court may serve as a fairly reliable indicator of the presence 
of an adversary relationship, but equating the two concepts and treat-
ing the more narrowly defined injury in fact as the sole method of es-
tablishing the constitutional component of standing102 ignores the 
possibility that other adversary relationships can serve as a sufficient 
guarantee that a case or controversy exists. 
Part of the problem created by the inc;:reased emphasis on the con-
stitutional element of standing stems from treating the key nouns of 
Article III-"cases" and "controversies"-as terms of art. 103 At least 
insofar as standing decisions are concerned, 104 cases and controversies 
could be regarded simply as occasions for courts to define legal rights 
or obligations. 105 To qualify as an appropriate occasion for judicial 
action, the court's determination must directly affect at least one of the 
parties. For example, the plaintiff may request a judicial definition of 
and nothing of immediate consequence to the parties hangs on the result." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 115 (1962) (emphasis 
added). The Supreme Court has required that the plaintiff have "alleged such a personal stake in 
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta-
tion of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962) (emphasis added); see a/so Flast v. Cohen, 392 
u.s. 83, 101 (1968). 
102. "Art. III's requirement remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable 
injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants." Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). But see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 
26,38 n.l6 (1976) (''the focus upon the plaintiffs stake in the outcome of the issue he seeks to have 
adjudicated serves a separate and equally important function."). Professor Tribe notes that the 
argument that injury in fact is constitutionally mandated by the cases and controversies limitation 
of Article III "cannot be deemed particularly persuasive." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 80 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
103. See, e.g., the recent exchange between Professors Brilmayer and Tuslmet: Brilmayer, The 
Jurisprudence of Article IIL· Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 297 (1979); Tushnet, The Sociology of Article IIL· A Response to Professor Bri/mayer, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980); Brilmayer,A Reply, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1727 (1980). 
104. This qualification is crucial to an understanding of what is suggested. This article objects 
to the expansion of the constitutional limitation on standing. Questions dealing with other reasons 
to place restraints on the exercise of judicial power are beyond the scope of the article. Thus, the 
minimalist interpretation of case or controversy being offered here does not necessarily apply to 
justiciability issues outside of the standing context. 
105. There is reference in the debates of the Constitutional Convention to "cases of a judiciary 
nature" as reflecting the meaning that Article III conveys in its use of the terms case and contro-
versy. See J. RADCLIFFE, THE CASE-OR-CONTROVERSY PROVISION 19 (1978). The author states 
that this reference was as close as the Convention came to saying what was meant by a case or 
controversy. He concludes: 
The courts have generally adopted the legalistic view . . . that what constituted a case in 
law or equity in 1787 was what the framers intended to include in the case-or-contro-
versy provision. It may have been that the framers thought the legalistic view to be self-
evident, or on the other hand, that they never realized the judiciary's future political 
importance. 
Id. at 20. 
Vol. 1982:1013] STANDING AFTER HAVENS REALTY 1035 
his rights vis-a-vis the defendant. The ruling by the court will then 
identify either the duty or the privilege of the defendant. 106 A judicial 
proceeding is no less a case or controversy, in the minimal constitu-
tional sense suggested here, simply because the plaintiff requests a judi-
cial definition of the defendant's obligations to persons other than the 
plaintiff. 107 
Fair Housing Act suits such as Havens Realty provide a fact setting 
that can illustrate this idea of "case" or "controversy". Assume that the 
realtors in the hypothetical city of Metropolis engage in racially dis-
criminatory steering practices. Such conduct violates a duty Congress 
imposed on the realtors; that much can be determined without addi-
tional information.108 Consider a series of differently-situated plaintiffs 
affected by the realtors' practices. The Group I plaintiffs are black pur-
chasers who were told by the realtors that housing was unavailable in 
Lilywhite Acres, a subdivision of Metropolis. As to those plaintiffs, the 
court can make a dual determination: the realtors are breaching the 
duty Congress imposed on them, as well as invading the right Congress 
106. The terms are those employed in W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS 
APPLIED IN JUDICiAL REASONING (1919). See generally J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' 
REASONINGS 139-45 (1964). 
107. In one of its most restrictive standing decisions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that as long as the article III injury requirement is satisfied, "persons to whom Congress has 
granted a right of action . . . may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and 
interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support of their claim." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Unfortunately, relying on Congress to create a right of 
action limits standing to assert the rights of others by reference to a matter not always susceptible 
to lucid analysis. See generally Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. 
L. REv. 1193 (1982). To link standing and the grant of a right of action may result in a distorted 
analysis of each of the two concepts because of judicial hostility toward one. If it is accurate to say 
that the Supreme Court "finds standing when it wishes to sustain a claim on the merits and denies 
standing when the claim would be rejected were the merits reached," Tushnet, The New Law of 
Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 663, 663 (1977), then decisions concern-
ing whether to infer a right of action where Congress has not explicitly created one may be simi-
larly affected by the Court's attitude toward the merits of the claim plaintiffs have asserted. 
Furthermore, reference to congressional ability to grant standing to assert the rights of others or to 
"invoke the general public interest" is misleading when manipulation of the constitutional ele-
ment of the standing determination-that the plaintiffhas suffered no injury in fact-can foreclose 
any consideration of congressional intent. 
108. But see J. STONE, supra note 106, at 140 n.7b ("whether a particular duty imposed, e.g., 
by statute, has a right in some other person correlative to it cannot be decided on conceptual 
grounds merely, but turns on interpretation or policy or both"). If all that is meant is that a 
particular person may not have a correlative right to enforce the duty the statute imposes, Stone's 
statement is unobjectionable. If the suggestion is rather that it is impossible to decide concep-
tually whether some (in the sense of any one) person has a correlative right, then the statement is 
meaningless, because the concept of a statutory duty includes within it the normal incidents of a 
legal system operating to make available a mechanism to enforce that duty. See H. HART, THE 
CoNCEPT OF LAW 27 (1961). 
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has conferred on the plaintiffs.109 The Group II plaintiffs are current 
residents of Lilywhite Acres. In their suit against the realtors, the resi-
dents would obtain both a determination that the defendants were vio-
lating the duty Congress imposed on realtors and a definition of the 
plaintiffs' right. In this case, however, the right of the plaintiffs imme-
diately affected by the realtors' conduct-and the right entitling these 
plaintiffs to relief-is the right to the benefits of racially integrated 
housing. 110 Group III plaintiffs are concerned Metropolis citizens who 
fit neither Group I (they are not black purchasers) nor Group II (they 
are not residents of target neighborhoods), but who object to the real-
tors' practices. 111 Those plaintiffs would sue to obtain a judicial defini-
tion of the duty of the realtors to comply with the Fair Housing Act. 
Even assuming that the realtors interfered with no specific right of the 
Group III plaintiffs,112 the lawsuit filed by these plaintiffs displays the 
"concrete adverseness" required by Article III as much as do the law-
suits filed by Group I and Group II plaintiffs. 113 
Suppose now that Realtor A, who does not happen to have any 
listings in Lilywhite Acres, sues Realtor B, who does have such listings, 
and alleges that Realtor B engages in racially discriminatory practices. 
Perhaps Realtor A actually wants to establish Realtor B's obligation to 
comply with the Fair Housing Act. But if Realtor A also engages in 
steering practices as a matter of course, he may bring the suit not for 
the purpose of having the court define Realtor B's obligations but 
rather for the purpose of establishing that Realtor B has no duty to 
refrain from this type of conduct in which both parties are engaging. 
Such a "collusive" suit would raise no actual dispute between the par-
ties, and thus does not present a case or controversy for judicial resolu-
tion.114 If Realtor A files a declaratory judgment action to establish his 
109. The buyer has the right to receive truthful information. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976). See 
supra text accompanying note 33. 
110. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 112 (1979); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 25-27. 
111. Willis, the white tester plaintiff in Havens Realty, would fall into Group lll if on remand 
he could not establish that he fit into Group II through evidence that he "lived in areas where 
petitioners' [realtors'] practices had an appreciable effect." 102 S. Ct. at 1123 (emphasis added). 
See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
112. The qualification depends on the acceptance of the informational injury characterization. 
See supra text accompanying note 44, which would also apply to those Group III plaintiffs who 
acted as testers. 
113. See supra note 101. 
114. Realtor A's goal may be "not to end Realtor [B's] discriminatory practices but rather to 
impair Realtor [B's] ability to compete in the marketplace," by trying to injure the reputation of 
Realtor B. Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Standing to Sue in Federal Court: The .Direct Injury Stan· 
dard, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 793, 809 (1980). If that is the case, Realtor A would be more 
interest~d in adducing evidence affecting the reputation of the defendant than in trying to estab· 
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own lack of obligation, then the true nature of his interest would be 
apparent, and someone (presumably an administrative agency) actually 
opposed to that interest could serve as a party with an interest suffi-
ciently adverse to the plaintiff seeking to establish a "right of de-
fense."ll5 But where a plaintiff seeks to establish the lack of obligation 
of another, and the plaintiffs interest is identical to that of the defendant, 
then the plaintiff has not presented the court with a case or controversy, 
and the action must be dismissed for failure to satisfy the constitutional 
component of standing.116 The existence of a benefit accruing to the 
plaintiff as a result of the court's resolution of the issues in favor of the 
defendant serves as the distinguishing feature from the lawsuits in 
which there is an adversary relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant. 117 
B. An Analytical Taxonomy of Practical Considerations in Standing 
.Decisions. 
If the constitutional barriers to standing are lowered to the level 
suggested above, 118 all but the few suits that can be labeled "collusive" 
will clear the Article III hurdle.1 19 To preserve standing as an effective 
method of setting limits on the cases that courts will hear necessitates a 
second level of inquiry. Categorizing the factors in this second-tier in-
lish the various elements necessary to prove a Fair Housing Act violation. A court could find that 
Realtor A has no real interest in having the court define Realtor B's duty or obligation to comply 
with the Fair Housing Act, and thus deny Realtor A standing. In this kind of case, as well as the 
case where there is collusion in the sense of an agreement between the parties to defraud the court, 
the concern is that the plaintiff abuses the opportunity that the litigation system provides for the 
parties to retain "process control," that is, "control over the development and selection of informa-
tion that will constitute the basis for resolving the dispute." Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Proce-
dure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 546 (1978). 
115. Stewart and Sunstein define the right of defense as "the right of those regulated to obtain 
judicial review of allegedly unauthorized government controls." Stewart & Sunstein, Public Pro-
grams and Private Rights, 95 HAR.v. L. REv. 1193, 1198 (1982). See generally id at 1246-55. 
116. In Hohfeldian terms, the Group I-III plaintiffs were concerned with establishing rights 
and duties. The collusion hypothetical brings into play privileges and no-rights, the jural oppo-
sites of duties and rights. See Cook Introduction, Holfeld"s Contributions to the Science of Law 28 
YALE LJ. 721 (1919) reprinted in W. HoHFELD, supra note 106, at 3-22. In that hypothetical 
Realtor A attempts to establish Realtor B's privilege to engage in racial steering, or correlatively 
the no-right of other persons to prevent Realtor B from engaging in such practices. The lack of a 
case or controversy is established because Realtor A actually seeks the privilege for himself and 
wants the no-right of others established as to his practices. 
117. As to adversity, see generally J. RADCLIFFE, supra note 105, at 47-63. 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 100-13. 
119. It may be difficult to determine collusion on the face of the pleadings if the identity of 
interest is not disclosed. Because standing is a jurisdictional matter, see supra note 8, a court 
would be justified in dismissing whenever the collusive nature of the suit became apparent. Fall-
ure to discern the collusion at the outset of the litigation would not serve as a waiver of the 
standing objection. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (h)(3) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction never waived). 
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quiry into practical, rather than constitutionally-imposed, considera-
tions promotes two important interests. First, courts will be forced to 
acknowledge that a standing decision is a discretionary matter with sig-
nificant policy implications, 120 and will no longer be able to hide be-
hind the seemingly ministerial function of deciding whether a 
constitutional requirement has been met. 121 Second, Congress will re-
tain a more decisive role in expanding and restricting the scope of 
standing than it has when the crucial factors are deemed to be constitu-
tional in nature. 122 
An understanding of the practical considerations that should oper-
ate in reaching a standing decision can lead to a more cooperative mesh 
of substantive legislative and procedural judicial standing decisions. 
Such an approach would avoid the need to characterize congressional 
action as sweeping aside all prudential limitations on standing. 123 As a 
result, this approach would reduce the likelihood that courts will con-
tinue to expand the constitutional component of standing to encompass 
essentially prudential matters involving, for example, the proper rela-
tionship between the courts and the legislature or the precarious posi-
tion of a court in a democratic society. 124 
The Supreme Court has at various times articulated prudential 
principles in the form of requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy in 
order to have standing. 125 The analysis suggested here is less rigid. It 
120. Tl.te desire for flexibility leads to identifying practical factors tl.tat should be considered 
rather than to defining prudential principles that would be applied to standing issues. See supra 
note 99. The Court's goal should be ''to abandon this maze of conceptions and categories and lay 
out the terrain on grander and simpler lines," L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 503, and to provide the 
"rational conceptual framework" that Professor Tusl.tnet finds lacking in the standing decisions of 
the Supreme Court. See Tushnet, supra note 107, at 663. 
121. A sense of the inevitability of a denial of standing emerges in Part II of Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion for the Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
122. Justice Brennan has objected to "the Court's insistence on resting [one of its most restric-
tive standing decisions] squarely on the irreducible Article III minimum of injury in fact, thereby 
effectively placing its l.tolding beyond congressional power to rectify." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Wel-
fare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 64 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
123. This has occurred, for example, in interpreting the standing provisions of the Fair Hous-
ing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1976). See supra note 32. 
124. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation ofCI.turch 
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 102, at 11-13, 47-52. See generally 
A. BICKEL, supra note 101, at 16-23. 
125. Justice Powell recaps the "prudential principles" as including the following: {I) "a liti-
gant normally must assert an injury that is peculiar to himself or to a distinct group of which he is 
a part, rather than one 'shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens' "; 
(2) a litigant "must assert his own legal interests, rather than those of third parties"; and (3) the 
interest asserted by the litigant must "at least be arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statutory framework within whicl.t his claim arises." Gladstone, Real-
tors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979). 
Vol. 1982:10131 STANDINGAFTER HAVENS REALTY 1039 
presents a number of variables that need to be evaluated in cases other 
than the paradigm "case of a judiciary nature" I26 in which a private 
individual plaintiff seeks judicial relief from the violation of a legal 
right directly caused by the private individual defendant. These vari-
ables include the following: 
(1) the status of the defendant; 
(2) the ability of the plaintiff to represent adequately the interest 
asserted; 
(3) the necessity of the plaintiff acting as an interest representative; 
( 4) the type of judicial proceeding employed; 
(5) the nature of the remedy sought; and 
(6) the type of conduct challenged. 
1. Status of Defendant. Standing determinations typically focus 
on the plaintiff, I27 but one of the key variables that ought to be taken 
into account is the status of the party being sued. The useful distinction 
is between government defendants and private defendants.I28 Standing 
should generally have a broader scope when the plaintiff sues a govern-
ment entity or official than when he sues a private person or institution. 
This guideline reflects a value judgment that if government stakes a 
claim to legitimacy, then it should stand especially accountable for its 
allegedly unlawful actions.I29 Particularly where nonmajoritarian gov-
ernment institutions are responsible for the challenged conduct, I30 the 
availability of a judicial avenue of control offers a more effective, more 
timely and more discriminating check on government unlawfulness 
126. See supra note 105. 
127. Occasions do arise when a defendant's standing is an issue. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 
346 U.S. 249, 254-60 (1953), where the Court had to decide whether a white defendant sued for 
damages for breach of a restrictive covenant had standing to assert the equal protection rights of 
blacks in the course of her defense to the action. 
128. Professor Scott has also noted the usefulness of this type of distinetion. See Scott, supra 
note 12, at 646. The distinction set forth in the text differs from the distinction between judicial 
review of administrative action aud other judicial proceedings. While they are perhaps the most 
common of this type of lawsuit, challenges to administrative agency actions represent only one 
subset of the broader class of actions against a government defendant. For example, the category 
of government defendant would include government individuals and entities exercising legislative 
or judicial functions as well as those acting in executive or administrative roles. 
129. This function of exercising control of the government is not performed with any regular-
ity or reliability through the democratic process. See L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 478-79 (if "even a 
well-run and responsive government gains from the energetic intervention of the individual ... 
[then] a fortiori inefficient and corrupt governments, however democratic, stand in particular need 
of the 'aroused citizen'"). Lawsuits attempting to control what the plaintiffs alleged to be unlaw-
ful conduct at the highest levels of government are exemplified by Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 
104 (D.D.C. 1973) and Halperin v. Kissinger, 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976), 434 F. Supp. 1193 
(D.D.C. 1977), rev'd, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), affd by equally divided court, 452 U.S. 713. 
130. See J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 74-77 (1978). 
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than would a resort to the political process.131 Accordingly, the fact 
that a plaintiff challenges conduct attributable to a government entity 
should usually be weighed in favor of the plaintiff having standing to 
sue.I32 
Conversely, when a plaintiff sues a private individual, the scope of 
standing could become more restricted. The possibility of strike suits 
or nuisance suits, brought for the purpose of coercing a settlement 
rather than obtaining judicial relief, is highest in this situation.133 An 
additional concern is that an imbalance of resources in favor of the 
plaintiff may produce circumstances where the result of a lawsuit is 
distorted by the inequality in the parties' ability to prepare for litigation 
or to pursue appellate review of unfavorable lower court decisions. 
That imbalance is unlikely to occur in a suit against a government 
defendant. 134 
131. See J. VINING, supra note 12. In describing the options available to the plaintiffs in 
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), Professor Vining notes 
the following: 
The data processors could not look to Congress for relief; the comptroller of the currency 
was not appointed by Congress. In any event, Congress had already spoken, and by the 
time it could be brought to speak again the world would be a different place and the data 
processors might well have put their resources in another business and have become 
something other than data processors. 
ld at 3. But see L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 476 ("the work done by public actions could, in my 
opinion, be better performed in most-though possibly not in all-cases by political and adminis-
trative controls. The prime argument, thus, for the public action would be the absence of these 
controls."). 
132. When the defendant is an agency of the federal government, the review provisions of the 
federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976), would govern the manner and 
scope of judicial review. Some analysts believe that actions under the APA should trigger less 
stringent standing requirements than are applied in other cases. See, e.g., Comment, Zoning-Dis· 
criminatory Intent Must Be Proved BefOre Courts May Reach Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec· 
tion Issues, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 233, 238 (1978). No discernible pattern in Supreme Court 
standing decisions of the last decade supports the conclusion that the Court actually operates in 
such a manner. Compare, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) 
(challenge to federal agency action governed by Administrative Procedure Act; very stringent 
standing requirements imposed) with· Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 
U.S. 59 (1978) (non-Administrative Procedure Act review; very liberal standing decision). 
133. In analyzing this point in the context of Fair Housing Act cases, one commentator ob-
serves that 
the risk of harassment and groundless lawsuits is not unbearably high. Title VIII re-
quires a private party to file his complaint within 180 days of a proscribed act. The 
burden of proof lS on the complainant. Damages are discretionary with the court and 
are limited to actual damages and a maximum of $1,000 punitive damages. The expense 
of prosecuting such a suit would deter groundless suits. However, the risk of multiple 
lawsuits would serve as an incentive not to discriminate. 
Comment, The Fair Housing Act: Standingfor the Private Attorney General, 12 SANTA CLARA L. 
REv. 562, 572 (1972). 
134. See Scott, supra note 12, at 673 ("The government does not lack for resources to prepare 
and defend the action, and plaintiffs will get no judgments by default."). 
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2. Ability of the Plaintiff to Represent the Interest. In the key 
standing decisions of the last decade, the United States Supreme Court 
focused on the plaintiff, asking whether he had suffered an injury in 
fact that will satisfy the constitutional test for standing.135 The exist-
ence of an important issue raised by "able litigants" has not sufficed to 
overcome a lack of palpable and distinct injury traceable to the defend-
ant's conduct and remediable by the relief requested from the court.136 
With the constitutional restrictions on standing satisfied by a showing 
of adverseness, 137 the ability of the plaintiff to represent the interest 
asserted becomes a crucial practical consideration in deciding the 
standing question.I38 
Filing a lawsuit may show a sufficient level of interest in the out-
come of the litigation to raise an initial presumption of ability to repre-
sent the asserted interest.139 Other factors that may support or rebut 
that presumption are how immediate or remote an interest the plaintiff 
has and how many others share the interest. If the defendant's conduct 
affects only the plaintiff, it is more likely that the plaintiffs initiation of 
the action satisfies the ability requirement; the risk of anyone other 
than the plaintiff being harmed should the plaintiff fail to represent the 
asserted interest remains so small that it should not detract from the 
plaintiffs standing. As the plaintiffs personal interest becomes more 
remote, however, courts should legitimately require that he show 
greater ability to represent not only his own ideological interests but 
also the practical interests of those most directly affected by the defend-
ant's conduct.140 Under these operating principles, then, an organiza-
135. See supra notes 16-60 and accompanying text. 
136. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, lnc., 454 U.S. 464, (1982). 
137. See supra notes 100-17 and accompanying text. 
138. The importance of this factor increases when the suit is brought against a government 
defendant. See supra text accompanying notes 127-34. Government action affecting the plaintiff 
will likely affect others who are in the same relationship to the government as the plaintiff. Fur-
thermore, when the relief sought will affect persons other than the plaintiff, see i'!fra text accompa-
nying note 152, representative ability takes on a heightened significance. See Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 
(1982), reflecting "due regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly affected 
by a judicial order," but indicating that Article III is the vehicle for displaying such regard. See 
generally Scott, supra note 12, at 675. 
139. Professor Scott notes that "apart from collusive suits ... (i]f plaintiff did not have the 
minimal personal involvement and adverseness which Article III requires, he would not be engag-
ing in the costly pursuit oflitigation." Scott, supra note 12, at 674. While the initiation of a lawsuit 
seems to be used by Scott as an indicator that the constitutional requirement of standing has been 
satisfied, it can also help establish whether, as a practical matter, a particular plaintiff can satisfac-
torily attack the conduct that gave rise to the litigation. 
140. The evaluation of this practical consideration resembles the inquiry into the ability of a 
class representative to represent adequately the interests of class members. See FED. R. C1v. P. 
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tion with a historical commitment to solving a particular problem 
would appear to be an able plaintiff in a suit with widespread and dif-
fuse effects involving that problem. For example, the Sierra Club 
would be a better environmental plaintiff than "an unincorporated as-
sociation formed by five law students . . . to enhance the quality of the 
human environment for its members, and for all citizens." 141 
3. Necessity of the Plaintiff as an Interest Representative. Closely 
tied to the ability of the plaintiff to represent the interest he asserts is 
the consideration of whether failure to recognize the standing of the 
particular plaintiff before the court will, as a practical matter, mean 
that no one will assert the interest. The less likely it seems that some-
one else can (both as a practical and as a legal matter)14 2 obtain a judi-
cial definition of rights or obligations comparable to that sought by the 
plaintiff, the more freely a court should grant the plaintiff standing. 143 
23(a)(4). By analogy, therefore, possible factors to consider include the following: (1) the "hon-
esty and conscientiousness" of the plaintiff; (2) the experience of plaintift's counsel "in the particu-
lar type of litigation before the court;" (3) the "professional competence" of plaintift's counsel as 
"demonstrated by the quality of the briefs and the arguments presented by the attorneys during 
the early stages of the case;" (4) the plaintift's financial stake in the outcome; and (5) the plaintift's 
counsel's stake in the outcome (attorney's fees). See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC· 
TICE AND PROCEDURE§§ l765-1767b (1972); cf. Scott, supra note 12, at 680 (the representative-
ness of the plaintiff is a factor to consider, but it should not be given much weight). 
141. This describes one ofthe plaintiff organizations in United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 678 (1973). But compare the Supreme 
Court's treatment of the plaintift's standing in that case with the treatment of the Sierra Club in 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Professor Scott suggests that 
a trade association or an organized interest group, though it could be said to have no 
interest of its own (i.e., purely as a separate business entity), seems an appropriate 
spokesman for those interests of its members which it is its very purpose to advance. The 
self-appointed representative, on the other hand, has no credentials to vouch for his de-
gree of representativeness, and the court can see this as making its judgment more diffi-
cult. In a doubtful case it might lead the court to deny standing. 
Scott, supra note 12, at 680-81. 
J42. The practical barriers to maintaining Fair Housing Act suits include both the cost of the 
litigation and ignorance of the right Congress has conferred. See Note, Gladstone v. Village of 
Bellwood: The J)evelopment and Application of Standing to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 9 CAP. 
U.L. REv. 175, 188 (1979). One of the obvious legal barriers would be the lack of anyone else with 
standing to sue, but this can quickly lead to circular reasoning in which it is not necessary to relax 
standing rules for the plaintiff because the standing of other potential plaintiffs might be recog-
nized. Other legal barriers that could prevent persons other than the plaintiff who is actually 
before the court from asserting the same interest include the ripeness doctrine, mootness, failure to 
exhaust other remedies, jurisdictional difficulties, and statutes of limitations/laches problems. 
- 143. One commentator on Fair Housing Act cases relied on this representative need factor to 
conclude that the Supreme Court's decision in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U.S. 91 (1979), "casts some doubt on the proposition that testers should have standing, simply 
because the principal argument in favor of it-that tester-plaintiffs are necessary to the full en-
forcement of the fair housing laws that Congress intended-is undercut by the availability of 
standing for local residents and municipalities." Schwemm, supra note 5, at 61. For the sugges-
tion that the facts of the Havens Realty case indicate a need for tester plaintiff standing, see supra 
notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
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Courts ought to relax the limitations on standing when presented with 
otherwise unreviewable action, particularly when the challenged con-
duct provides only a benefit to those directly affected. 144 People receiv-
ing a benefit from allegedly improper conduct will probably not seek to 
have the conduct declared unlawful. Similarly, when those whose 
rights are directly injured by the challenged conduct are unlikely to 
maintain their own action seeking judicial relief, courts ought to be 
more lenient in deciding that the plaintiff who is actually before the 
court does have standing.14S 
4. Type of Judicial Proceeding. The forum in which a plaintiff 
must challenge a defendant's conduct, 146 together with the type of pro-
ceeding that forum may entertain and the scope of review that will be 
employed, should affect how courts decide whether a plaintiff has 
standing. The relative flexibility of the type of proceeding that the 
plaintiff can use to challenge a defendant's conduct, the ease with 
which a plaintiff can obtain access to a judicial forum and the multi-
plicity of suits that a defendant might face all legitimately entitle a 
court to favor, as a prudential matter, a restrictive approach to stand-
ing. Conversely, when only a single forum 147 with a limited type of 
proceeding (such as a substantial evidence review of administrative 
agency action148) is available to a very limited number of litigants,l49 
144. But see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); supra note 86. 
145. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 {1976). "If there is some genuine obstacle to" the 
assertion of a person's own rights, "the third party's absence from court loses its tendency to 
suggest that his right is not truly at stake, or truly important to him, and the party who is in court 
becomes by default the right's best available proponent." Id at 116. 
The existence of some public official's authority to bring an action should not be used to 
restrict the standing of private individuals to challenge the same conduct As one commentator 
notes: 
The right of the Attorney General to originate suits under Title VIII is an important 
enforcement tool. However, realistically he should not be expected to do the total job. 
The vigor with which the Attorney General will pursue the right afforded to him will 
depend on the Administration's philosophy regarding the goal and the funds and man-
power resources available. 
Comment, supra note 133, at 573. 
146. Much of federal administrative agency action is reviewable only in the federal courts of 
appeals. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(l) (Supp. I 1977) ("A petition for review of the [Environ-
mental Protection Agency] Administrator's action in approving or promulgating any [Clean Air 
Act state] implementation plan ... may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the appropriate circuit."). In some cases, only the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit may review the agency action. See, e.g., 42 U.S. C.§ 7607(b)(l) (Supp. I 1977) ("A petition 
for review of action of the [Environmental Protection Agency] Administrator in promulgating any 
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard ... may be filed only in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."). In most other actions against either the 
government or private parties, a plaintiff will begin the litigation process in a state or federal trial 
court. 
147. See supra note 146. 
148. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). 
149. This limitation could involve both practical and legal considerations. See supra note 142. 
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prudence dictates that an expanded notion of standing would be appro-
priate in order to increase the likelihood that there will be some judicial 
consideration of the claims being asserted. I 5o 
5. Nature of the Remedy Sought. A plaintiff may seek a variety 
of judicial remedies in order to force others to behave in a lawful man-
ner. The court should consider the type of relief sought in determining 
whether the plaintiffhas standing. One type of remedy focuses primar-
ily on control of the defendant's conduct in the future: declaratory and 
injunctive relief, as well as the prerogative writs that may be used to 
control government action, ISI fall into this category. Characteristically, 
these kinds of remedies tend to change the behavior of the defendant. 
A relaxed attitude toward standing ought to accompany judicial con-
sideration of requests for such remedies, at least in part because the 
disposition of just a single action will achieve the goal of obtaining a 
judicial definition of the plaintiff's right, determining the defendant's 
duty or, as in the case of a declaratory judgment action, acknowledging 
the plaintiff's privilege. I52 
150. These guidelines roughly correspond to the practical guideposts in the pre-lJata Process-
ing Supreme Court decisions regarding review of administrative action. In those decisions, when 
Congress had established a specific method of statutory review, see generally W, GELLHORN & C. 
BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 145-46 (6th ed. 1974), and thus a more lim-
ited access to the courts, standing rules tended to be interpreted liberally. See, e.g., FCC v. Sand-
ers Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); supra notes 61-95 and accompanying text. When 
Congress had not specified any particular method of review, standing tended to contract. See, 
e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1968); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 
(1940). 
Professor Scott has made the somewhat different point on the same line of cases that, when 
the plaintiff utilizes a specific statutory review process, "the Court has before it only the imple-
menting, secondary decision as to whether there is reason not to allow the particular plaintiff in 
question to be one of those who may invoke the review-and the standing rules tend to become 
much more liberal." Scott, supra note 12, at 656. On the other hand, absent a specified method of 
review, the 
Court has proceeded on the premise that the constitutional or statutory limitation which 
defendant is claimed to have violated should be thought of not as a restraint on the 
government or its agents, but as a benefit bestowed on some definable part of society. 
Thus, the Court has been able to view a plaintiff, if not a member of that favored group, 
as not possessing a sufficient interest to be allowed to enforce the limitation. 
I d. at 654. Although Scott's statements concerning nonstatutory review contain hints of a legal 
injury approach by tying standing to membership in ''that favored group,'' that is, those on whom 
a benefit has been bestowed, they nevertheless illustrate the proper effect the type of proceeding 
should have on the exercise of judicial discretion to recognize standing. 
151. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976). See generally L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 165-94, for a 
discussion of these remedies in the context of obtaining judicial review of government conduct. 
152. The potential for disruption of the defendant's operations inherent in this kind of rem-
edy, particularly in the case of a government defendant, appears to encourage a restrictive ap-
proach to standing. For an explanation of why these potential disruptive effects should not, 
however, have much weight in a standing analysis, see Scott, supra note 12, at 678. 
Vol. 1982:10131 STANDING AFTER HAVENS REALTY 1045 
The plaintiff may seek the other general type of remedy, which 
focuses on correcting the harm the defendant's conduct has produced 
in the past and requires an examination and evaluation of the specific 
effects of his past conduct. In such cases-for example, the computa-
tion and award of compensatory damages-a court could properly dis-
play a tendency to restrict standing to those who have actually suffered 
the effect in question. By limiting standing in this way, a court in-
creases the likelihood that the plaintiff will present it with the evidence 
and arguments that lead to an accurate correlation of the remedy that is 
sought and the duty that has been breached. 
6. The J)pe of Challenged Conduct A defendant may have vio-
lated any of a number of positive sources of law, including a constitu-
tional provision, a statute or a rule of common law. The court should 
consider the particular source of the law that a plaintiff alleges a de-
fendant to have violated in determining whether that plaintiff has 
standing to complain of the violation. The first step is to construct a 
hierarchy of the sources of law, with the constitution at the top and the 
common law rules at the bottom. A scale of standing can then be su-
perimposed on that hierarchy, with the restrictive end of the standing 
scale corresponding to the common law end of the hierarchy and a 
more open approach to standing indicated at the constitutional end of 
the spectrum.153 
The logic of this scale lies in the greater commitment a society 
should have to the fundamental principles embodied in its constitution. 
When a plaintiff alleges violations of those principles, courts normally 
should not deny him the opportunity to present the merits of his claim 
solely because of practical consider.ations about how best to use judicial 
power. 154 At the other extreme, courts requested to adjudicate rights 
derived from decisions of judges in prior disputes might well limit 
standing to those plaintiffs presenting the more traditional common law 
action between a directly injured plaintiff and a defendant responsible 
153. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982), the Court declared that it knew "of no principled basis on 
which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary 'sliding scale' of stand-
ing." The approach suggested in the text does not involve a ranking of different provisions within 
each of the major categories: e.g., constitution, statute, administrative rule, common law. It calls 
instead for a ranking of the categories themselves. 
154. But see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., id. at 473, where Justice Rehnquist indicated a reluctance to declare unconstitutional 
an act of the legislative or executive branches of government, seeing such judicial action as 
presenting "the ultimate threat to the continued effectiveness in performing" the judicial role of 
"vindicating individual rights." · 
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for that injury.155 Statutory rights and obligations, created as they are 
by the elected representatives of the people, deserve at least a presump-
tion of enforceability in favor of those who have an interest in those 
rights and obligations, even absent a direct injury.Is6 
C. The Framework in Operation. 
To test the analytical framework just outlined, this section de-
scribes and analyzes a set of model cases, focusing on the practical 
standing considerations raised in the preceding section. The analyses 
assume a satisfaction of the constitutional requirement of standing as 
set out in part III(A) of the article; only a little thought is needed to 
reach the conclusion that each model exhibits the requisite adversary 
relationship between the parties that ensures the existence of a case or 
controversy. 
1. The jive model cases. 
Modell: 
This type of case presents each of the various factors as they will 
appear at the most liberal end of the standing spectrum: an individual 
alleges a constitutional violation resulting from an administrative 
agency action that immediately affects his interests and files a petition 
in a court of appeals to set aside the administrative agency action. 
Model2· 
The circumstances of this case are similar to those of Model 1, 
except that the plaintiff chooses to sue for injunctive relief, and the ju-
dicial forum is a federal district court rather than an appellate court. 
Model3: 
An organization with a long history of concern for a particular 
interest sues in a federal district court to enjoin further government 
155. Where the existence of the right a plaintiff asserts depends on the decision in a previous 
case or line of cases, courts would justifiably be reluctant to continue the common law develop-
ment process without having before them plaintiffs able to demonstrate a direct interest in the 
establishment of that right and the defendant's duty. 
156. If Raz's distinction between "duty-imposing laws" and "power-conferring laws" is valid, 
see J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL 
SYSTEM 147-66 (2d ed. 1980), perhaps the presumption suggested in the text should only arise with 
respect to those statutes that prescribe behavior-"duty-imposing" statutes. In any event, a de-
fendant might be able to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend 
for persons other than those who suffer a direct invasion of statutorily-conferred rights to have an 
opportunity to challenge the defendant's conduct. Such rebuttal necessarily would include a 
showing of a specific negative legislative intent, and thus be distinguishable from current develop-
ments in the implied 1 $t of action cases, where the Supreme Court requires a showing of some 
basis from which to inft • a congressional intent to confer a private right of action to enforce a 
statutory scheme. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 107, at 1196 n.5. 
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conduct that violates a statute and directly invades the interest that the 
organization asserts. 
Mode/4: 
An organization formed to addres·s a particular instance of unlaw-
ful conduct asks a trial court to enjoin further instances of a private 
individual's violation of a statute. 
Mode/5: 
An individual with only an ideological interest in a problem as-
serts a claim for damages payable to those injured by a private individ-
ual's violation of a common law rule. 
2. The models analyzed. In analyzing each of these five models 
within the framework of practical considerations developed above, 157 
an "initial rough guess"158 would identify a fairly clear-cut case against 
standing only in ModelS. In each of the other four models, the reasons 
for recognizing standing could outweigh whatever the prudential con-
siderations of judicial economy and the like which call for a dismissal 
of the action without reaching the merits. 
Model 1 presents the clearest case for a lenient approach to stand-
ing. The defendant, a nonmajoritarian institution, 159 can be kept under 
some sort of popular control only through the device of judicial re-
view.160 Congress has created a review mechanism in the courts of ap-
peals. That process can result in a conclusive determination of the 
legality of the agency's conduct. Should the court set aside the agency 
action, all those adversely affected in any way by the action will have 
obtained relief. Should the court uphold the agency action, those af-
157. By way of review, that framework calls for a consideration of six factors: (I) the status of 
the defendant; (2) the ability of the plaintiff to represent the asserted interest; (3) the necessity of 
the plaintiff as interest representative; ( 4) the type of judicial proceeding; (5) the nature of the 
remedy sought; and (6) the type of challenged conduct. See supra notes 127-156 and accompany-
ing text. 
158. The term is borrowed from G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS 140-43 (1970), to try to capture the first impression a case makes on the 
observer familiar with the framework and experienced in its application. It is this impression that 
is likely to be created by the pleadings in a case, and it is therefore on this basis that courts will 
often evaluate the plaintiff's standing. 
159. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 130, at 74-77. 
!60. Institutional constraints on administrative action, including a range of executive and leg-
islative controls, do exist. See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 50-146 (7th ed. 1979). But such controls are not as effective as judi-
cial control. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. Professor Jaffe notes that judicial 
control of government action provides a "modest measure of control of official action," and that 
although "there are probably better ways, ... we have not yet seen fit to adopt them." He con-
cludes that litigation as a method of control of government action is "at the least, not inconsistent 
with our democratic premises, and arguably [legal actions] reinforce them." L. JAFFE, supra note 
2, at 483. 
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fected by the action will know how to accommodate their behavior to 
an official environment that includes the agency action. Two rationales 
explain this behavior modification: future challenges will be decided 
the same way; and subsequent challengers will be bound by the judicial 
decision under an issue preclusion doctrine that relaxes the require-
ment of mutuality of estoppel.161 Government adherence to a nation's 
basic operating principles, as set out in its constitution, is so important 
that courts ought to grant standing to even remotely affected plaintiffs 
to pursue this avenue of judicial review. But given the possible wide-
spread impact of the judgments issued by reviewing courts, they should 
carefully scrutinize plaintiffs ability to provide a full airing of the is-
sues, for courts rely on plaintiffs to aid them in understanding the scope 
of the problem presented for judicial resolution. 
In Model 2 the posture of the case changes from a petition for 
review in an appellate court to an action for injunctive relief in a trial 
court. The importance of the goal of providing judicial review of alleg-
edly unconstitutional agency action remains just as high as in Model 1. 
Now, however, the agency faces the prospect of a multiplicity of actions 
and the corresponding possibility of inconsistent judicial demands. A 
multiplicity of suits also implies some wasteful duplication of judicial 
effort devoted to understanding and resolving the issues presented. 
Thus, some reluctance to recognize the standing of individuals with 
only a very remote interest in the agency action is appropriate. Courts 
might be restrictive in standing determinations in cases other than 
those that present for review some allegedly unconstitutional action by 
a government defendant. With directly affected individuals, such as 
the Model 2 plaintiff, however, courts should exercise their vital role in 
our political and judicial system, through which the government is held 
in check, by recognizing a plaintiffs standing if he will otherwise ade-
quately represent the interest he asserts. If such directly affected plain-
tiffs are unable or unlikely to challenge the government action, courts 
need to acknowledge that they can fulfill their control function only by 
granting more remotely affected individuals and groups standing to 
make such challenges. 
Model 3 presents a type of alleged misconduct for which a lower-
ing of standing barriers is somewhat less compelling than the unconsti-
tutional conduct of Models 1 and 2. The key variables consequently 
become the necessity for, and ability of, this organization to represent 
161. Compare Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) and Park1ane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) with American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Secretary of HEW, 677 F.2d 118 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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the interest asserted. If both necessity and ability seem relatively high, 
the court should grant standing to the organization. 162 
Model 4 differs from the previous model in that the Model 4 or-
ganization exists as an ad hoc arrangement to deal with a specific prob-
lem. In such cases the representative quality of the plaintiff 
organization becomes a crucial factor. The nature of the defendant has 
also changed: this model introduces a private defendant and the ac-
companying possibility of harassment through litigation. A grant of 
standing to the organization is still justified by the fact that the re-
quested relief seeks to change the defendant's behavior in the future, 
rather than to assess some sort of penalty or obligation to compensate 
for past wrongs. Given the limited resources of the public institutions 
or authorities charged with enforcing private adherence to statutory di-
rectives, the kind of case presented in Model 4 can serve an important 
function in producing a society that operates under a rule of law. 
In Model 5, the nature of the relief sought and the status of the 
defendant trigger a restrictive approach to standing. The difficulty of 
evaluating and awarding damages based on injury to persons who are 
not parties, in conjunction with the risk that a plaintiff not directly af-
fected by the defendant's conduct may not offer the full range of evi-
dence a court needs to fashion the remedy, would argue against 
granting standing to this plaintiff. The fact that the rights or obliga-
tions that the plaintiff seeks to have adjudicated arise from the common 
law may also indicate that the significance of those rights lies primarily 
in adjusting the relationships among private individuals, rather than 
effecting the broader ordering of society that might legitimately require 
relaxed standing decisions in order to be successful. 
162. The analysis of Models 2 and 3 along these lines would have produced different results in 
three of the Supreme Court's most egregiously restrictive recent standing decisions. See Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 
(1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727 (1972). The Supreme Court has appeared to be the least willing to hold governmental 
institutions to-a standard oflawful conduct in Model2 and 3 cases and has based those refusals to 
review agency action on a lack of standing. Accordingly, the analytical framework offered here 
would likely produce the greatest change. It would transform the standing doctrine from a means 
of manipulating the range of substantive issues that courts wish to reach to a doctrine that is 
aimed purely at controlling access to the judicial process, and on a pragmatic rather than an 
abstract basis. But see Scott, supra note 12, at 670 & 684 (suggesting that standing can serve two 
functions: access standing as "a judicial determination of whether the nature and extent of the 
alleged harm to a plaintiff are such as to warrant deciding his case," and decision standing "to 
determine the proper scope of judicial policymaking responsibility," which should properly be 
seen as a justiciability question). 
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IV. CONCLUSION. 
The current state of the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence 
makes it difficult to determine where we are, let alone to try to predict 
where we are going. Two unfortunate trends do, however, assume ma-
jor significance. First, the Court has increasingly constitutionalized the 
law of standing. Second, as this article demonstrates, the Court has 
begun to establish a foundation on which "it can rebuild a legal injury 
approach to standing. Neither trend fits two increasingly important 
roles of the courts: first, to serve as a means of controlling the more 
overtly regulatory institutions of government; and second, to provide a 
vehicle for establishing and maintaining stability of relationships 
among the various components of society. The trends tend to down-
play the significance of the public interest aspect of much litigation. 163 
The Supreme Court's decision with regard to the white tester 
plaintiffs standing in Havens Realty combines the two trends noted 
above. As a result of earlier decisions, any Fair Housing Act denial of 
standing must be a matter of constitutional limitations on standing.t64 
By focusing narrowly on the rights created by the statute, and using 
that focus as the basis for its decision as to the standing of the white 
tester plaintiff,t65 the Court seems to be making the legal injury impli-
cations of its standing decision a matter of constitutional import. An 
analysis of the white tester standing issue in Havens Realty employing 
the alternative framework offered in this article will show how the judi-
cial roles described above can be better fulfilled at the standing deter-
mination stage of litigation. 
The constitutional requirement of an adversary relationship be-
tween plaintiff and the defendants would be established by plaintiff's 
status as an employee of HOME, the organization working to increase 
housing equality. Had plaintiff not been employed by or otherwise af-
filiated with such a group, some evidence of plaintiff's bona fide oppo-
sition to the defendants' practices could be demanded. Once this 
constitutional component of standing is satisfied, the focus shifts to a 
consideration of whether there are practical reasons to grant or deny 
standing to this particular plaintiff. Application of the six factors de-
scribed in Part ill (B) produces a basis for analysis of the white tester's 
standing. The plaintiff is suing a private defendant for the violation of 
163. See L. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 522 ("Judicial review can serve two functions: to remedy 
the violation of a protected interest; to vindicate the public interest."). 
164. See supra notes 32, 39. 
165. See supra notes 16-60 and accompanying text. 
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a federal statute. 166 The complaint sought declaratory, injunctive and 
monetary relief from a federal trial court. 167 The ability of the plaintiff 
to represent the interest being asserted is reinforced by the organiza-
tional support he appears to have from the organization that employs 
him. 
Having identified the factors for consideration, the court should 
then weigh the factors and evaluate the strength of plaintiff's case for 
standing. The fact that defendants are alleged to be violating a statute 
raises a presumption that the plaintiff has standing to enforce the statu-
tory obligations Congress imposed on the defendants. 168 That pre-
sumption is not rebutted by a legislative intent to limit those who could 
enforce the statutory scheme for regulating realtors' conduct; in fact, 
examination of the standing provisions of the statute reinforces the pre-
sumption.169 The defendants' private status may weigh against stand-
ing for the plaintiff, 170 particularly given the request for monetary 
relief. 171 As to the injunctive relief claim, however, the defendants are 
the precise targets of the legislation, and granting the plaintiff standing 
would reinforce the legislative purpose in enacting the Fair Housing 
Act. Although the claim is brought in a trial court, and thus indicates 
that defendants could be subjected to a multiplicity of lawsuits,172 the 
defendants are apparently operating in a fairly limited geographical 
area, and thus would not face lawsuits dispersed across the country, as 
would, for example, a government agency. The prospect of multiple 
suits in a particular location would serve as an additional incentive for 
defendants to comply ~th the terms of the statute.173 The plaintiff's 
ability to represent the interest in enforcement of the Fair Housing Act 
could use further investigation.174 A significant point about this litiga-
tion, however, is its relatively simple nature; no complex scientific or 
technological proof is needed, nor is extensive factual evidence re-
quired. The proof of the elements of defendants' Fair Housing Act 
violation would seem to be well within the ability of a plaintiff who can 
166. 102 S. Ct. at 1118 (suit against Havens Realty Corporation and one of its employees, 
alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976)). 
167. Id 
168. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. 
169. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1976) and supra note 32. 
170. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text. 
173. See supra note 133. 
174. Because the Havens Reallj' lawsuit was a class action, see 102 S. Ct. at IllS, the examina-
tion of the plaintifrs ability to act as the class representative under FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) will 
determine the plaintifrs ability to represent the interest at issue in 11leCiiSe. See supra note 140. 
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afford to retain competent counsel. 175 Perhaps the factor pointing most 
strongly toward a denial of standing is the existence in this suit of other 
plaintiffs, espeeially HOME, thus indicating that the need to grant 
standing to this plaintiff is weak. 176 Given the fact that the claim of one 
of the plaintiffs whose legal right to truthful information was violated is 
barred because of the limitations provisions of the statute, 177 however, 
the need for timely initiation of a lawsuit becomes an important consid-
eration. Furthermore, reliance on an organization acting as plaintiff is 
subject to reservations similar to those encountered in relying on the 
Attorney General to sue:178 the organization may have limited re-
sources available for litigation, and may have difficulty in defining liti-
gation aims. 179 On balance, the framework for analysis of standing 
questions developed in Part III produces the conclusion that the white 
tester plaintiff in Havens Realty does have standing. While the frame-
work outlined here provides only the contours within which courts will 
have to exercise discretion, it does identify the factors courts should 
consider and indicates grounds on which courts can explain why they 
exercise that discretion in a particular way. With the increased recog-
nition that there is judicial discretion in making standing determina-
tions comes a heightened responsibility to identify and articulate the 
bases for standing decisions as access controls180 to the federal courts. 
175. This ability is increased by the statutory provision for an award of attorney's fees to a 
plaintiff who "is not financially able to assume said attorney's fees." 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). 
Such a provision is further evidence of the importance that private enforcement plays in the legis-
lative attempt to promote nondiscriminatory housing. 
176. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra note 32. 
178. See supra note 145. 
179. See generally R. KLUGER, SiMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V, BOARD OF EDU· 
CATION i\ND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) for a discussion of this problem 
in the context of litigation to desegregate education. 
180. See supra note 162. 
